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MIXED SOURCE
RAMON CASADESUS-MASANELL† AND GASTO´N LLANES‡
Abstract. We study competitive interaction between profit-maximizing firms that sell
software and complementary goods or services. In addition to tactical price competition,
we allow firms to compete through business model reconfigurations. We consider three
business models: the proprietary model (where all software modules offered by the firm are
proprietary), the open source model (where all modules are open source), and the mixed
source model (where a few modules are open). When a firm opens one of its modules,
users can access and improve the source code. At the same time, however, opening a
module sets up an open source (free) competitor. This hampers the firm’s ability to capture
value. We analyze three competitive situations: monopoly, commercial firm vs. non-profit
open source project, and duopoly. We show that: (i) firms may become “more closed” in
response to competition from an outside open source project; (ii) firms are more likely to
open substitute, rather than complementary, modules to existing open source projects; (iii)
when the products of two competing firms are similar in quality, firms differentiate through
choosing different business models; and (iv) low-quality firms are generally more prone to
opening some of their technologies than firms with high-quality products.
Keywords: Open Source, User Innovation, Business Models, Complementarity, Vertical
Differentiation, Value Creation, Value Capture (JEL O31, L17, D43).
1. Introduction
As is well understood by now, commercial firms may benefit from participating in open
source (OS) software development by selling complementary goods or services. For exam-
ple, IBM sells consulting services and proprietary software that is complementary to the OS
software that it develops, Red Hat sells subscription services, and Sun sells complementary
hardware such as servers. In particular, the combination of OS software and proprietary
extensions has grown into an important phenomenon. In fact, the expressions mixed source
and hybrid source have been used to refer to a business model whereby a software firm re-
leases an open source version of its software and derives revenue from selling proprietary
complementary code. Examples include: JasperSoft (business intelligence software), Zimbra
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(server software for email and collaboration), SugarCRM (customer relationship management
software), Hyperic (systems monitoring, server monitoring, and IT management software),
xTuple (enterprise resource planning software), Zenoss (enterprise IT management software),
Talend (data integration software), and Groundwork (IT management and network moni-
toring software).
Even fervent advocates for proprietary software have jumped on the bandwagon. Having
stated in 2001 that “open-source is an intellectual property destroyer [...] I can’t imagine
something that could be worse than this for the software business,” Microsoft has recently
switched course to embrace the notion of mixed source.1 Amongst other initiatives, it has
partnered with Novell to put some of Microsoft’s technologies on Linux and other open
platforms. The Mono project, for example, consists of porting the .Net framework onto
Linux and the Moonlight project is about providing an offer of Siverlight for Linux.2 And in
July 2009, Microsoft agreed to contribute some of its technology to Linux under a licensing
agreement that allows developers outside Microsoft to modify the code.3
Open source has the potential to improve value creation because it benefits from the
efforts of a large community of developers. Proprietary software, on the other hand, results
in superior value capture because the intellectual property remains under the control of
the original developer. Industry observers, however, point out that strict open source and
proprietary approaches to software development “don’t work in a world where innovators
have to innovate, investors need a profit, employees need to eat, and customer needs must
be met.”4 The reasoning is that proprietary development leads to little innovation and open
source leads to little profits. According to Horacio Gutierrez (Microsoft’s Deputy General
Counsel for IP Licensing): “striking a balance between [embracing open-source software and
brandishing patents] is one of the key things every commercial technology company must do
in order to compete effectively.”5 Figure 1 illustrates the “popular case” for mixed source.
Oracle’s April 2009, $7.4 million acquisition of Sun can be understood by reference to the
figure. Sun’s most important software products were the Java programming language and the
Solaris operating system. On November 13, 2006, Sun released Java as open source under the
1The quote is by James Allchin (Microsoft’s executive in charge of Windows 2000 rollout). See Ben Charny,
“Microsoft raps open-source approach,” CNET News.com, May 3, 2001 and http://www.infoworld.com/
print/38795.
2Silverlight is a Web-based digital video technology by Microsoft. It is a plug-in for delivering media and
interactive applications for the Web.
3Microsoft announced the release of 20,000 lines of device driver code to the Linux community. See http:
//www.marketwatch.com/story/microsoft-defends-nuanced-open-source-approach.
4Greg Thomas, “Microsoft and Mixed Source Software.” (October 22, 2008). See http://www.infoworld.
com/d/mobilize/microsoft-exec-touts-mixed-source-ventures-795.
5See http://www.marketwatch.com/story/microsoft-defends-nuanced-open-source-approach.
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Figure 1. The case for mixed source development.
GNU General Public License. Likewise, a large part of Solaris’s codebase was open sourced
in 2005. Industry observers claimed that Sun’s excessive openness prevented the company
from capturing sufficient value. On the other hand, most of Oracle’s products, such as the
Oracle Database or the Oracle Fusion Middleware, were proprietary. The combination of
Sun and Oracle created a mixed source corporation aiming a better balance between the
potential for value creation and the potential for value capture as shown in Figure 1. The
choice of Sun was quite natural because the Fusion Middleware was built on Java and Solaris
was the leading platform for the Oracle Database. Both firms’ main products were highly
complementary.
While the straightforward rationale for mixed source presented in Figure 1 is appealing,
the desirability (or lack thereof) of the mixed source business model is more nuanced. An
implication of Figure 1 is that software firms always benefit from mixed source. However, we
do not see every software firm opening (a portion of) its technologies. The question arises:
under what circumstances should a profit-maximizing firm adopt a mixed source business
model? And for firms considering the adoption of a mixed source business model, which
technologies should be open and which should remain closed/proprietary? Should the core
software be opened or is it better to open the extensions?
Likewise, the popular case for mixed source does not consider how business models of
different industry players interact. While the adoption of mixed source may be optimal when
the firm is alone in the market, competition may render this business model suboptimal. A
4 CASADESUS-MASANELL AND LLANES
question that has not yet been addressed in the literature is: how should firms respond to
competitors’ adoption of mixed source business models?
Finally, the argument for mixed source of Figure 1 provides little advice on how firms that
adopt that business model should price their products. What are the right pricing structures
under mixed source compared to the proprietary business model? In this paper, we present
a formal model that addresses these questions.
We set up a game-theoretical model where profit-maximizing firms that sell software and
complementary goods or services (such as training or support services) must choose whether
to open all or part of their technologies and the prices at which to sell their goods. The
software that the firms offer is composed of two modules: a base (core) program and a set of
extensions. The base program may be used without the extensions. The extensions, on the
other hand, are valueless unless they are used in conjunction with a base program, i.e. the
base program is an essential complement to the extensions (see Chen and Nalebuff 2006).6
Firms may open the base, the extensions, or both.
Consistent with the terminology used in the software development community, we refer
to the different degrees of openness as business models. Thus, we consider three business
models. In the proprietary model, all the software offered by the firm is closed, and in
the open source model, both modules are open. In the mixed source model, one module is
open and the other one is closed. The mixed source model has two variants. In the open
core model, the base program is open and the extensions closed, and in the open extensions
model, the base program is closed and the extensions open.
Figure 2 shows examples of the different business models that we consider.
Figure 2. Examples of the different business models.
6More generally, the extensions represent not only software modules, but all those technologies and protocols
which have value only if used with the firm’s core software.
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The trade-off in our model builds on Figure 1. When a module is opened, users can access
and improve the source code, which increases quality and value creation.7 At the same
time, however, the firm is setting up an open source competitor of its program which may
cannibalize the revenues of the proprietary version. This hinders the firm’s ability to capture
value. We study how this trade off is affected by: (i) the value of complementary services that
the firm may offer, such as support for software implementation or tailoring the software to
customer specifications; (ii) the strength of user innovation; and (iii) competitors’ responses,
which include strategic reconfigurations in competitors’ business models and tactical price
adjustments.
We present our model and analysis in three parts, each building on the previous one. In
Section 3, we analyze the case of an incumbent firm that enjoys a monopoly in its market
segment (i.e. there are no open or commercial substitutes for the firm’s software) and that
sells its product (a combination of software and a complementary good or service) to a
measure one of potential customers. We refer to the product sold by the monopolist as the
commercial product. The incumbent monopolist chooses the business models through which
it would like to operate. As long as the base module is kept proprietary, the firm remains
a monopolist. The firm can benefit from user innovation by opening some (or all) of its
software modules. However, when the base module is opened, a free, open source product
emerges. We refer to the open source product set up by the monopolist when opening the
base module as the OS product. The willingness to pay for the OS product is lower than
that for the commercial product because it does not come bundled with the complementary
good or service.
We find that when the value of the complementary good (z) and the strength of user
innovation (σ) are low, the firm will open the extensions only. For intermediate values of
z and σ, the firm prefers to open the base module instead of the extensions. For z and σ
sufficiently large, the firm will open both modules. In the first two cases, the firm prefers
to compete through a mixed source business model, and in the third case, the firm is using
the pure open source business model. The intuition is simple. Large z increases the vertical
differentiation between the commercial product and the OS product. Therefore, the business
stealing effect is mild in this case. Likewise, when σ is large, the quality improvement that
occurs when modules are opened, outweighs the negative competitive effect.
In Section 4, we consider the case in which the firm faces competition from an external
open source project. This means that consumers may use a free open source product, even
if the firm decides to compete through a proprietary business model. We allow the firm to
replace any one of its modules with the available open source module/s if it desires to do so.
7This effect is sometimes referred to as demand-side learning. See Casadesus-Masanell and Ghemawat (2006).
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We find that the firm may become “more closed” in response to competition from an
outside OS project: compared to the monopoly situation, the firm is more likely to use
a proprietary business model. In particular, the firm will be wary of opening the set of
extensions when the outside OS project has a base module. A combination of the outside
base module and the firm’s extensions result in a stronger free competitor.
When considering which mixed source business model to employ, the firm will always
prefer the one that adds less value to the outside OS project. Thus, the firm is more likely
to open substitute, rather than complementary, modules to the outside OS project.
Finally, we find that the firm will prefer to adopt the modules developed externally when
these are of higher quality than the firm’s own modules. When the outside OS project has
modules of higher quality than those developed internally by the firm, the trade off between
value creation and value capture of Figure 1 is broken: increased openness not only results
in superior value creation but also in better value capture.
In Section 5 we study a profit-maximizing duopoly (firms H and L) which, in addition to
prices, choose the business models through which they would like to compete. We assume
that firm H has modules of higher quality than firm L. We analyze the following game:
(i) in the first stage either H or L chooses business model, (ii) in the second stage, the
other firm observes the first mover’s business model and chooses its own, (iii) finally, both
H and L simultaneously determine the prices of their commercial packages. This section
studies competition through business models : firms best responding to each other’s choices of
business models, taking into account the equilibria of the subgames that different business
models combinations set up.
We find that when the exogenous quality difference between H and L is low, one of the
two firms competes through a proprietary business model and the other opens one module,
generally the extensions. As the quality difference grows, cannibalization concerns lessen and
both competitors elect to compete through the same mixed source business model. Likewise,
when user innovation σ is low, only one of the two firms competes through a mixed source
business model. The other firm is proprietary. And when σ is high, the equilibrium has both
firms adopting a mixed source model.
We also find that both firms may prefer to compete through the proprietary business model
when H is the first mover. This business model profile, however, never occurs when L is the
leader. Thus, the low quality firm is more interested in competing through a mixed source
business model than the high quality firm. Finally, we also show that quality leapfrogging
may occur in equilibrium when L moves first but that it never happens when H leads.
Our theoretical model provides a formal base on which to build recommendations for
management practice. In Section 6 we present simplified versions of our main results through
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easily accessible matrices. In each case, we discuss what drives our propositions and lemmas
and present policy recommendations that can be directly applied to the design of optimal
business strategies. We also discuss the implications of our findings for the strategy literature,
particularly as they relate to the subfield of value-based business strategy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We first position our contribution in relation
to the literature. In Section 2 we introduce the basic elements of our model. Section 3
presents the monopoly benchmark. In Section 4 we analyze competitive interaction between a
profit-maximizing firm and a non-strategic OS competitor. The more challenging case where
the business models of two strategic, for-profit companies are endogenously determined is
presented in Section 5. Section 6 discusses the managerial implications and relates our results
to a number of real-world examples. Section 7 concludes. The proofs of all propositions and
lemmas are in Appendixes A and B. For completeness, in Appendix C we present the analysis
of a few additional cases that, because of space constraints, we decided not to include in the
main text.
1.1. Related literature. Our paper contributes to the literature on the economics of open
source. For the most part, early papers on OS were concerned with explaining why individual
developers contributed to OS projects, allegedly for free (see Lerner and Tirole (2005) and von
Krogh and von Hippel (2006) for excellent surveys). The most common explanations were:
altruism, personal gratification, peer recognition, and career concerns. Bagozzi and Dholakia
(2006), for example, demonstrate that participation in OS development is partly explained by
social and psychological factors and Roberts, Hann, and Slaughter (2006) find that status and
career concern motivations significantly influence developers’ levels of participation. Baldwin
and Clark (2006) argue that the architecture of the code may affect the developers’ incentives
to contribute. Specifically, they show that a modular codebase mitigates free riding in OS
development.
While the contributions of individual developers have played a crucial role in the growth
of open source software, the same is true of contributions by commercial firms. In fact,
in a carefully executed empirical piece, Bonaccorsi, Rossi, and Giannangeli (2006) show
that fully proprietary and fully open software firms are rare. Instead, firms typically adopt a
hybrid business models. The presence of complementarities has been documented by Fosfuri,
Giarratana, and Luzzi (2008). The authors perform an econometric analysis and find that
firms with a larger stock of hardware patents and trademarks are more likely to participate in
OS. Shah (2006) investigates the effects of sponsorship of open source projects by commercial
firms and finds that voluntary developers tend to contribute less, have different motivations
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for contributing, and take on fewer code maintenance tasks than in the absence of such
sponsorship.
On the theory front, a handful of papers have introduced profit maximizing OS firms
(Henkel 2004, Bessen 2006, Schmidtke 2006, Haruvy, Sethi, and Zhou 2008). In these papers,
commercial firms may profit from OS by selling complementary goods and services. However,
these works consider OS firms in isolation, rather than in competition against proprietary
firms. In fact, the interaction between open source and proprietary firms has been identified
as an important topic for further research by Lerner and Tirole (2001, 2002, 2005).
The papers that study competition between the two development paradigms set up duopoly
models of a profit-maximizing, proprietary firm and a community of not-for-profit/non-
strategic OS developers that sell at zero price (Mustonen 2003, Bitzer 2004, Gaudeul 2005,
Casadesus-Masanell and Ghemawat 2006, Economides and Katsamakas 2006, Lee and Mendelson
2008). In these papers, however, the business model choice by firms and the market structure
are exogenously given. We endogeneize these constructs.
An important precedent for our paper is Llanes and de Elejalde (2009) which presents
a model where profit-maximizing firms decide whether to be open source or proprietary.
Firms profit from selling goods and services which are complementary to the software. The
main trade-off is between the lower appropriability of the investment in R&D in OS and
the duplication of effort in the proprietary model. These authors show that even when the
appropriability of the investment in R&D is low, there are equilibria where both kinds of
firms coexist in the same markets. These equilibria are characterized by an asymmetric
market structure, with many small open source firms and a few large proprietary firms.
Most importantly, this market structure arises endogenously, even though all firms are ex-
ante symmetric.
Our paper builds upon this literature and presents a novel approach to the study of optimal
business models and equilibrium market structure. Specifically, our modeling contributions
are: (1) firms have multiple software modules and must decide which modules to open and
which to keep proprietary, (2) firms choose not only between the two pure business models
(open source and proprietary), but may also compete through a mixed source model, (3)
we analyze the case of a monopolist, but also the cases in which a for-profit firm competes
against a not-for-profit OS project, and against another for-profit firm. As a consequence of
our modeling strategy, a variety of market structures may arise in equilibrium, combining
proprietary, mixed source, and open source firms.
Our paper also contributes to an emerging literature in strategy that explores competitive
interactions between organizations with different business models. While there are several
formal models of asymmetric competition that exist in strategy (differences in costs, resource
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endowments, or information, mainly), the asymmetries that this literature wrestles with are
of a different nature: firms with fundamentally different objective functions, opposed ap-
proaches to competing, or different governance structures. The papers mentioned above on
competition between open source and proprietary firms belong to this literature. In addition,
Casadesus-Masanell and Yoffie (2007) study competitive interactions between two comple-
mentors, Microsoft and Intel, with asymmetries in their objectives functions stemming from
technology—software vs. hardware. Casadesus-Masanell and Zhu (2009) study competitive
interaction between a high-quality incumbent that faces a low-quality ad-sponsored competi-
tor. Finally, Casadesus-Masanell and Hervas-Drane (2009) analyze competitive interactions
between a free peer-to-peer file sharing network and a profit-maximizing firm that sells the
same content at positive price and that distributes digital files through an efficient client-
server architecture. For the most part, this literature has studied interactions between firms
with exogenously given business models.8 We contribute by endogeneizing the choice of
business model by two profit-maximizing firms that compete to attract customers.
2. The model
2.1. Preferences. Preferences are based on a variant of Gabszewicz and Thisse’s (1979) and
Shaked and Sutton’s (1982) models of vertical product differentiation. There is a continuum
of consumers of mass 1, who differ in their valuations of the available products. Consumers
are indexed by ρ, where ρ ∼ U [0, 1]. Consumer ρ’s indirect utility from consuming good i is:
uρ i = ρ vi − pi,
where vi and pi are the quality and price of product i.
Given the list of qualities and prices for all products available, each consumer will choose
the product that maximizes his indirect utility.
2.2. Technology. Consumers derive utility from consuming software modules and a com-
plementary service z. There are two software modules: a base module and a set of extensions,
denoted by a and b, respectively. With a slight abuse of notation, we use the same symbol to
refer to a software module (or service) and to the value of that software module (or service).
Let a > 1 and b > 1 be the value of modules a and b, respectively, and z > 1 be the value
of service z. We assume zero marginal costs.
Software modules and service are complementary. The value of a package composed by
software modules a and/or b and service z is the product of the value of its components. For
8The exception is Casadesus-Masanell and Zhu (2009) who allow the incumbent (but not the entrant) to
choose business model.
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example, if a package is composed by modules a and b, its value is v = a b, and if it also
includes service, its value becomes v = a b z.
Module a constitutes the base (core) of the program and module b is a set of extensions
that run over module a. This means that module b has no value if it is not used with module
a, so the value of a package which does not include module a is zero. Similarly, support
has value only when used in conjunction with software. Although, for concreteness, we
refer to b as software extensions, b represents more generally those technologies, protocols,
documentation, and ideas that have value only if used in conjunction with the core software
a. For instance, file format protocols are of little value if there is no core software with which
to use them.
Modules may be opened or kept closed. The advantage of opening a module is that
users can improve on it. We assume that when a module is opened, its value increases to
ao = a (1 + σ qo) or bo = b (1 + σ qo) where σ measures the extent of user innovation and qo
is the measure of users of the open source module.9
Opening a module increases the value of all packages containing that module. For example,
if a package includes both modules and service, and the base module a is opened, its value
becomes v = ao b z.
2.3. Expectations. When a module is opened, before users decide whether to adopt it or
not, the firm and the users form expectations on the measure of users that will adopt it, qeo.
Suppose, for example, that module a is opened. Before users decide whether to adopt it or
not, they form expectations on the value of that module. This value depends on how many
users are expected to use the module in equilibrium: aeo = a (1 + σ q
e
o).
What is the relation between qeo and qo? We follow Katz and Shapiro (1985) and assume
fulfilled expectations. The expected number of users qeo is taken as given by consumers and
firms when they make their decisions. What Katz and Shapiro’s (1985) criterion requires is
that those expectations be fulfilled in equilibrium: qo = q
e
o. While the equilibrium qo depends
on the expectation qeo, the advantage of this approach is that there is no need to specify how
expectations are formed.
2.4. Business models. We consider four business models. Two pure models and two mixed
models. The pure models are the proprietary and the open source business models. These
are pure models because all modules are either closed or open:
Proprietary (P ): In the proprietary model both modules, a and b, are closed. This
model has no user innovation.
9The user innovation term is similar to a network externality. In contrast to network externalities, however,
if the firm decides not to open the module, user innovation is absent.
MIXED SOURCE 11
Open source (O): In the open model both modules are open. User innovation is
maximal in this case.
The two mixed models have one open module. The other module is closed. The two
possibilities are:
Mixed source with open a (Ma): This business model has the base module open.
10
When Ma is adopted, an open source competitor that offers module a for free will
emerge.
Mixed source with open b (Mb): In this model, only the extensions b are open. The
implication is that no open source competitor emerges when this business model is
adopted because the extensions cannot be used without a base module.
The most common definition of business model is “the logic of the firm, the way it operates
to create and capture value for its stakeholders.”11 Thus, a firm’s real business model includes
a broad range of organizational and competitive elements such as products & markets, sources
of revenue, incentive systems, hiring policies, information technologies, and so on. Detailed
descriptions of business models are often too complex to be amenable to mathematical
treatment. We follow Casadesus-Masanell and Zhu (2009) and represent business models
through profit functions. Thus, in our formal development the choice of business model is
represented through the choice of profit function.
Profit functions are reduced form representations of actual business models. As such,
they do not capture the full richness of the entire business model. However, they allow the
derivation of formal propositions, which is an important goal of our study. Representing
business models through profit functions captures the idea that choosing a business model
implies more than just determining the value of a particular variable or parameter: it entails
the selection of the logic of the firm, the way it operates to create and capture value for its
stakeholders.
2.5. Cases. We consider three alternative competitive scenarios. In Section 3, we analyze
the case of a monopoly that must choose its business model and where to price its products.
In Section 4, we examine a simple duopoly where a profit-maximizing firm faces an open
source competitor that is nonstrategic. And in Section 5 we study the less tractable case of
two for-profit firms that best-respond to each others’ pricing and business model choices.
While the specifics of each scenario differ (we explain them in detail in the corresponding
section), the generic sequence of decisions that we study is as follows:
10This business model is sometimes called open core. See http://www.linuxinsider.com/story/66807.
html, for example.
11See Baden-Fuller, MacMillan, Demil, and Lecocq (2008).
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(1) Firms decide which business model to adopt.
(2) Expectations on qo are formed and firms decide where to price their products.
(3) Given qeo, business models, and prices, consumers pick their preferred product.
We solve for the subgame perfect equilibrium with fulfilled expectations.
2.6. Strategy vs. tactics. Building on Ghemawat (1991) and Casadesus-Masanell and
Ricart (2009), we refer to the choice of business model as strategy : the business model
is a set of committed choices that lays the ground for the tactical interactions that will
occur down the line. Thus, business model choices are strategic whereas pricing choices are
tactical. This terminology reflects the fact that while the choice of business model often
implies commitments which may be difficult to reverse, pricing choices are easy to change.12
2.7. Modeling assumptions. Before delving into the analysis, we discuss three important
modeling assumptions.
Base vs. extensions. Our distinction between base and extensions reflects the fact that
while some software modules can be used standalone, others require a base to function. This
distinction captures important asymmetries between specific and general applications. Some
software modules have general value, while others have been designed for highly specialized
uses. The extent of module specificity affects its value to the open source community. In
the case of general applications, a larger number of developers are likely to contribute and
user creativity and innovation are likely to be enhanced. Although we assume that the
extent of innovation per user is the same for both modules, endogenous adoption of the
base is often larger than the extensions when they are opened. Therefore, consistent with
the phenomenon, in our model there is more user innovation for the base than for the
extensions.
User innovation. We have adopted a reduced-form approach to modeling user innovation:
more users imply more user innovation and thus higher quality software. The strength of
this relation is governed by the parameter σ. Our specification is simple and intuitive but
has limitations. This modeling choice has been made for tractability.
An interesting direction for future research is to “open the black box” of user innovation,
by endogenizing the users’ decision to contribute and/or provide feedback. This would al-
low the study of many interesting issues arising from user innovation. For example, having
more developers working on a particular software may increase its complexity, raising the
communication and coordination requirements. This is well summarized by Brooks’s Law:
12For example, once the a module has been opened, there is no way back to being proprietary because the
code is in the public domain.
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“adding more programmers to a late project makes it later.” Therefore, having more de-
velopers may imply higher coordination costs. The firm may end up bearing some of these
costs. The works by Baldwin and Clark (2006) and MacCormack, Rusnak, and Baldwin
(2006) suggest that open source projects have responded to this challenge by becoming more
modular. Modularity is likely to have a positive impact on the quality of the firm’s software
and its development costs. In addition, modularity allows for a higher speed of debugging,
which increases software stability. In fact, open source proponents claim that open source
has effectively broken Brooks’s Law.
While in our model all users value openness and user innovation, in reality there may be
some users who disagree with the current direction of development. A more general model
would allow users decide which elements of the code to adopt and which to discard. That
is, a more complete model would allow users to choose the development path.
Compatibility. In Sections 4 and 5 we introduce a competing product for the firm. In one
case, the competing product is provided by a non-profit open source project. In the other
case, the competing product is provided by another commercial firm. In both cases, we
assume full compatibility between the modules and service of the competing projects.13
We focus the analysis on the compatible case because, with compatibility, the interaction
between the firm and any available outside open source projects is maximal. If the compet-
ing modules were incompatible with those of the firm, then the competitor could not take
advantage of the modules opened by the firm, and the firm would be more likely to open its
modules (this case would then be similar to the monopoly situation analyzed in Section 3).
Likewise, the firm is less likely to adopt the modules of a competitor if they are incompatible
with the complementary good or service that the firm is providing. A thorough analysis of
partial compatibility and incompatibility presents an interesting direction for future research,
but lies beyond the scope of the paper.
3. Monopoly benchmark
A monopolist facing a unit mass of consumers with utilities as described in Section 2.1
and a technology as given in Section 2.2 must decide to operate under one of four business
models. Each business model gives rise to one product that the monopolist sells at positive
price.14 We refer to the product sold by the monopolist as the commercial product. There is
13That is, when the firm opens a module, it can be combined with the complementary module of its com-
petitor, and/or its support service. Likewise, if a competing module is opened, the firm can include it in its
commercial product as it is fully compatible with its other module and/or service.
14The monopolist could consider selling several, horizontally differentiated, products. In Appendix B we allow
the monopolist to produce and market as many products as she wishes, and we show that the monopolist
will always prefer to offer only one product, which is the one that we are considering.
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a one-to-one relationship between the four business models and the products offered by the
monopolist. Letting vc be the quality of the commercial product, we have:
P : vc = a b z.
Ma: vc = ao b z.
Mb: vc = a bo z.
O: vc = ao bo z.
When the monopolist opens module a, an open source competitor emerges. The reason is
that module a can be used standalone and, thus, some users may prefer it to the monopolist’s
commercial offering (which is of higher quality but sold at positive price).15 When b is opened,
however, no open source competitor appears because module b cannot be used without the
base a. Therefore, two of the available business models imply the emergence of competition
(O and Ma) while the other two (P and Mb) ensure that the monopolist remains the only
firm in the market.
Just as in the case of the commercial product, there is a one-to-one relationship between
the four business models and the available open products. Letting vo be the quality of the
open source product, we have:
P : vo = 0. No open source product available.
Ma: vo = ao.
Mb: vo = 0. No open source product available.
O: vo = ao bo.
The sequence of decisions is as follows:
(1) The firm chooses a business model.
(2) Expectations are formed on the share of the population that adopt the available open
modules. Given these expectations, the monopolist sets the price of its commercial
product.
(3) Consumers choose between the commercial product, the open source product (if
available), and staying out of the market.
We now solve the monopolist’s optimization problem. As usual, we proceed backwards.
We first consider the consumers’ purchase decision (given that one or two products are
offered) and derive the demand functions. Then, we find the profit-maximizing price under
each business model. Finally, we let the monopolist choose a business model. We impose
that expectations be fulfilled in equilibrium.
15In this section, we will refer to the commercial firm as the monopolist regardless of the fact that, when a
is opened there is competition by an open source project.
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3.1. Consumer demands. Suppose first that there is no open source product available.
This means that consumers have two options: they can either buy the commercial product
and obtain utility u = ρ vc− p, or they can refrain from consuming and obtain u = 0. There
is a cut-off point ρ0 depending p such that only consumers with ρ > ρ0 will buy the product
of the firm at that price. The demand for the commercial product is:
qc = 1− p
vc
.
Suppose now that there is an open source alternative. Consumers can either buy the
commercial product at price p, consume the open source good for free, or stay out of the
market. Since the open source product gives utility u = ρ vo > 0, consumers never choose
to stay out and the relevant comparison is between the commercial and the open source
products. Figure 3 shows the utility schedules for the commercial and open source products.
Figure 3. Consumer utility. Commercial and open source products.
Demand for the commercial product and the open source alternative are, respectively:
qc = 1− p
vc − vo
qo =
p
vc − vo .
3.2. Pricing decision. In choosing prices, the firm is interested in maximizing profits:
pi = p qc.
When the commercial product is the only one available, the optimal price is p = vc/2,
which implies an equilibrium quantity of 1/2 and profits of pi = vc/4. As is well-known, a
monopolist that faces a linear demand function and has zero marginal cost of production
16 CASADESUS-MASANELL AND LLANES
trades off volume and markup optimally at a price equal half the choke price and ends up
serving half of the market.
When there is an OS alternative, the inverse demand function that the monopolist faces is
p = (vc−vo)(1− qc). This is a linear demand function. Thus, the optimal price is once again
half the choke price vc − vo, half of the market is served, and profits are pi = (vc − vo)/4.
Finally, the optimal price and profits depend on the precise functional forms of vc and vo
which, as seen above, depend on the business model chosen by the firm. Specifically, the
profits that each business model generate are as follows:
P : pip = a b z/4.
Ma: pia = ao (b z − 1)/4.
Mb: pib = a bo z/4.
O: piab = ao bo (z − 1)/4.
3.3. Business model choice. The firm decides which module/s it should open, taking
into account the expected number of users, its subsequent pricing decisions, the demand
schedule, and that an open source competitor will emerge if module a is opened. The choice
between business models depends on the comparison of profits which, in turn, depends on
the strength of user innovation and the value of the modules and service (a, b, and z).
The first point to notice is that P is dominated by Mb. Mb is unambiguously superior to
P because it takes advantage of user innovation to produce a higher quality product but it
does not set up an open source competitor.16
Given that P is dominated by Mb, the three profit functions that must be compared are
those for Ma, Mb, and O. The following thresholds are useful to state our first proposition
which characterizes the monopolist’s choice of business model.
σa|b :=
2
b z − 2 , σa|ab :=
b− 1
b (z − 1) , σb|ab :=
1 +
√
z (9 z − 8)
4 (z − 1) −
3
4
.
Proposition 1. Suppose that either 2 < b < 3 and z ≤ 2
(3−b)b , or b ≥ 3 hold. Then, if
σ ≤ σa|b, Mb is the optimal business model; if σa|b < σ ≤ σa|ab, Ma is the optimal business
model; and if σ > σa|ab, the optimal business model is O. Suppose, instead, that either
2 < b < 3 and z > 2
(3−b)b , or 1 ≤ b ≤ 2 hold. Then, if σ ≤ σb|ab, Mb is the optimal business
model; and if σ > σb|ab, O is the optimal business model.
Figure 4 shows the regions on which each business model is optimal in (σ, z) space.
16More generally, the firm can open all those technologies, protocols and ideas which have no value unless
they are used with the base module, instead of remaining completely closed. For instance, if the firm’s
base software is necessary to read a particular format for saving data or to compile code written in a given
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Figure 4. Optimal business models for a monopolist.
When σ and/or z are large, the optimal business model is O, regardless of the values
of all other parameters. Large σ implies large user innovation when a and b are open.
However, an open source competitor emerges, degrading the firm’s ability to capture value.
Notwithstanding, when σ is large the trade off is resolved in favor of opening the software
to the maximal possible extent. When z is large, the vertical differentiation between the
commercial product and the open source product that business model O sets up is large. As
a consequence, the presence of the open source product does not harm much the ability of
the firm to earn large profits. Thus, when z is large, the firm prefers to open both modules.
When σ is small the optimal business model is Mb as there is little to gain from user
innovation and there is no point of being too open. As σ increases the preferred business
model eventually becomes Ma. The difference between Mb and Ma is as follows. When b is
opened, no open source competitor emerges. When a is opened, a new competitor surfaces
which forces prices down. But Mb does not exploit user innovation to the same extent that
Ma does: when Mb is chosen,
1
2
of the market adopts the product17 and when Ma is chosen,
everybody adopts. The trade off is resolved in Ma’s favor when σ is large.
18
programming language, the firm may open the file format or language without hampering its ability to capture
vale. This is precisely what goes on in the cases of Microsoft’s .Net framework, Stata, and Mathematica.
17Recall that the profit-maximizing price of the monopolist results in adoption by exactly half of the market.
18When 2 < b < 3 and z ≥ 2(3−b)b , whenever Ma is superior to Mb, it turns out that O is superior to Ma.
This is why for z ≥ 2(3−b)b , Ma is never chosen.
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3.4. Value creation and value capture. The profit-maximizing choice of business model
depends on the resolution of a trade-off between value creation and value capture which are
defined as follows:19
Value creation (V ): Is the sum of the firm’s profits and consumer surplus: V =
CS + pi.
Value capture (θ): Is the proportion of the value created which is appropriated by
the firm (in the form of profits): θ = pi
CS+pi
.
Using the above definitions, firm profits can be expressed as pi = θ V . It is straightforward
to compute V and θ:
V =
3
8
vc +
1
8
vo, θ =
2 (vc − vo)
3 vc + vo
,
setting vo = 0 when there is no open source alternative.
Figure 5a compares value creation and value capture for the different business models.20
As discussed above, value capture under P coincides with that under Mb but value creation
is larger under Mb. Given that profits are pi = θ V , we can easily plot the isoprofit curves.
Obviously, curves farther away from the origin correspond to higher profits and the profit-
maximizing business model is the one reaching the highest isoprofit curve. Figure 5b shows
the isoprofit curves and business models. In this example, the optimal business model is Mb.
The figure shows that there is a trade off between value creation and value capture: Mb
allows for maximal value capture but value creation is low, Ma erodes value capture but
strengthens value creation, and O deteriorates value capture further but value creation is at
its maximum.
A glance at V and θ reveals that regardless of the business model, value creation grows
when a, b, z or σ increase. When a or σ increase, however, value capture remains constant.
The reason is that value creation and profits grow at equal rates with a or σ regardless of
whether there is an open source competitor or not. When z increases, value capture remains
constant for P and Mb, and increases for Ma and O. And when b increases, value capture
remains constant for P , Mb and O, and increases for Ma.
19The expressions value creation and value capture became mainstream in strategy since the publication of
Brandenburger and Stuart (1996) and Brandenburger and Nalebuff (1997). See also MacDonald and Ryall
(2004). In Brandenburger and Stuart’s (1996), all transactions with positive value take place. Therefore,
value created equals potential value. However, Brandenburger and Stuart also recognize that there may exist
‘frictions’ which may introduce a wedge between potential and realized value. In our model, for example,
the monopolist cannot price discriminate. Hence, there are transactions with positive potential value that
do not occur in equilibrium (i.e. there is a welfare loss). Our definition of value creation corresponds with
actual value created, which is more relevant for studying the choice of an optimal business model. For an
insightful discussion of value creation and value capture and endogenous business models, see Salas-Fumas
(2009).
20The parameter values are: a = 1, b = 1.5, z = 1.2 and σ = 0.1.
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(a) Ranking of business models. (b) Isoprofit curves.
Figure 5. Value creation & value capture in the monopoly case.
Note that our definition of value is equivalent to welfare. This means that Figure 5a also
serves to rank the different business models in terms of welfare. The socially optimal model
(in a second best sense) is O. As we have seen, the socially optimal business model is not
always chosen by the monopolist.
4. Competition from an outside OS project
In this section we analyze a situation where an incumbent firm (modeled like the mo-
nopolist of Section 3) faces a non-strategic competitor that enters the market with an inde-
pendently developed open source product. Think, for example, of a non-profit open source
project like Apache or Linux, competing against a for-profit firm like Microsoft or IBM.
Because a substitute is available for the firm’s product even if it decides not to open any of
its modules, the open source project imposes competitive pressure on the incumbent.
Let aˆ ≥ 1 and bˆ ≥ 1 represent the external open source modules and their values. We will
consider two cases: (1) the open source project has modules of lower quality than the firm,
and (2) the open source project has modules of higher quality than the firm.21
As in Section 2.2, the value of a combination of modules and service is the product of
their individual values, and a set of extensions (b or bˆ) has no value unless it is used with a
base (a or aˆ). We assume full compatibility: either a or aˆ may be combined with b or bˆ, and
z. Therefore, the incumbent may embed an outside open source module in its commercial
software if this leads to higher profit. Likewise, the open source project may combine one of
its modules with one of the modules opened by the incumbent.22
21We are assuming that the open source project provides substitutes for both modules. In Appendix C
we analyze alternative scenarios in which the open source project provides only one of the two modules or
provides one module with higher quality and another one with lower quality than those of the firm. The
main conclusions of our analysis remain unaffected.
22See our discussion of compatibility in Section 2.7.
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The incumbent must choose the business model through which it would like to compete.
The choice set is the same as in the previous section: P , Ma, Mb, and Oab. The only
difference is that the firm may adopt the module/s available from the open source competitor.
Therefore, there are two flavors to the business model with open a: Ma and Maˆ. Likewise
for Mb. Similarly, there are four flavors of business model Oab.
Each business model gives rise to one commercial product which is sold at a positive price,
but in this duopolistic setting there is always an open source product available to consumers,
regardless of the business model choice made by the incumbent.
In addition to the commercial product, consumers may have a choice over two open source
products, the outside OS project and the open product set up by the firm (if it decides to
compete through a business model that involves opening at least one module). A slight
complication that arises in this case is that there may be multiple equilibria. The reason is
that the expected value of open products (and, thus, demand for them) depends on how many
users are expected to use them. In some circumstances, more than one way to coordinate
purchases satisfies Katz and Shapiro’s (1985) criterion discussed in Section 2.3. To sidestep
this issue, we assume that consumers coordinate to choose the open source product with
highest (exogenous) quality, before taking into account the effect of user innovation.
The firm must choose its business model and price. The optimization problem is similar
to that of Section 3. Given price and qualities, consumers choose their preferred product.
The sequence of decisions is:
1. The firm chooses business model and whether or not to adopt any of the available
modules from the outside open source project.
2. Expectations are formed on qo and the firm sets price.
3. Given qeo, the choice of business model and price, consumers choose between the open
source product and the commercial product.
Given vo and vc, the functional forms of demands and profits are the same as in the
monopoly case (see Section 3.1). The only difference is that the open source products may
now be based on the outside open source modules, the modules opened by the firm, or a
combination of both.
4.1. The firm has modules of higher quality. We start by analyzing what happens
when a > aˆ and b > bˆ. As discussed above, the possibility of adoption of the modules
provided by the outside OS project mean that there are multiple implementations of the
mixed and open source business models. The possibilities are: Ma, Maˆ, Mb, Mbˆ, Oab, Oaˆb,
Oabˆ, and Oaˆbˆ. In addition, the firm may also choose P .
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We will show that: (1) the firm will never embed the external open source modules in its
commercial offering, (2) when choosing between the different mixed source models, the firm
will open the module that faces stronger competition from the open source project, and will
keep closed the module which could potentially increase more the value of the open source
product, and (3) the firm may choose to be P , M or O, so all possible business models may
arise as an equilibrium outcome.
We begin by showing that whenever the firm is considering a mixed source or an open
source business model, it will always choose to base its commercial product on its own
modules (i.e. the firm will never adopt the modules supplied by the external open source
project).
Lemma 1. When the modules of the firm are of higher quality than those of a non-strategic
open source competitor, the firm will never choose to embed those modules in its commercial
product, i.e. the firm will never choose the Maˆ, Mbˆ, Oabˆ, Oaˆb, or Oaˆbˆ business models.
Lemma 1 is a consequence of complementarity. Suppose, for example, that the firm is
considering a mixed source model with open base. The firm chooses betweenMa andMaˆ. The
firm might be tempted to choose Maˆ because opening a implies that the resulting open source
competitor will be of higher quality than if the firm chooses Maˆ. However, complementarity
with b and z implies that the quality of the firm’s product increases relatively more than the
quality of the open source product in a is opened. Therefore, the firm will prefer Ma to Maˆ.
The above lemma implies that the firm will consider only P , Ma, Mb and Oab. The values
of vc and vo and profits are:
P : vc = a b z, vo = aˆo bˆo, and pip = (a b z − aˆo bˆo)/4.
Ma: vc = ao b z, vo = aobˆo, and pia = (ao b z − ao bˆo)/4.
Mb: vc = a bo z, vo = aˆ bo, and pib = (a bo z − aˆo bo)/4.
Oab: vc = ao bo z, vo = ao bo, and piab = ao bo (z − 1)/4.
Next, we show that, for given a, b, aˆ, and bˆ, either Ma dominates Mb or vice versa
(regardless of the values of z and σ). When a/aˆ > b/bˆ, the firm prefers to open b. Likewise,
when a/aˆ < b/bˆ, the firm prefers to open a. There are two ways to interpret this result.
On the one hand, the firm wants to open the module which faces greater competition from
the OS project. On the other hand, the firm wants to keep proprietary the module which is
more complementary to the software of the OS competitor.
Lemma 2. Ma is preferred to Mb if and only if a/aˆ < b/bˆ, and vice versa.
The intuition is that opening a or b produces the exact same benefit for the firm (ao b z =
a bo z). The costs differ, however, because the quality of the open source competitor depends
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on which module is opened. The quality of the competitor is ao bˆo if a is opened and aˆo bo if
b is opened. In comparing Ma and Mb, the firm will prefer the business model that results
in the lowest possible value for the outside OS project.
Finally, we proceed to characterize the optimal choice of business model for all possible
values of σ and z. The above lemmas imply that there are only three candidates for optimal
business model: P , Oab, and either Ma or Mb.
Note that, contrary to the monopoly case, Mb does not dominate P for all parameter
values. The reason is that when b is opened, users of the open source project can combine
aˆ with b to assemble a product of quality aˆo bo. Having a stronger open source competitor
may lead to decreased value capture by the for-profit firm.
The following thresholds are used in Proposition 2:
za|p :=
bˆ (2 + σ) (2 a (1 + σ)− aˆ (2 + σ))
4 a b σ
, zb|p :=
aˆ (2 + σ) (2 b (1 + σ)− bˆ (2 + σ))
4 a b σ
,
zab|a :=
2 b (1 + σ)− bˆ (2 + σ)
2 b σ
, and zab|b :=
2 a (1 + σ)− aˆ (2 + σ)
2 a σ
.
Proposition 2 (Equilibrium regions). If a/aˆ < b/bˆ, then P is optimal when z < za|p, Ma
is optimal when za|p < z < zab|a and Oab is optimal when z > zab|a. If a/aˆ > b/bˆ, then P is
optimal when z < zb|p, Mb is optimal when zb|p < z < zab|b and Oab is optimal when z > zab|b.
Figure 6 illustrates the optimal strategy for different parameter value combinations. For
low values of σ and z, the firm chooses the proprietary business model (P ), for intermediate
values, the firm chooses a mixed source model (either Ma or Mb), and for high values of σ
and z, the firm becomes completely open (Oab).
The intuition is simple. When σ and z are low, there is little benefit from opening modules
as user innovation is weak. Moreover, low z means that if the firm was to open any module,
the outside OS project would become close in quality and competitive pressure would be
strong. Therefore, the firm is better off with a proprietary business model in this case.
As σ and z increase, so does the value creation implications of opening modules and the
vertical differentiation between the OS project and the firm’s product. When σ and z are
sufficiently large, the additional value creation of opening one module outweighs the increased
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(a) a = 2, b = 3.5, aˆ = 1, bˆ = 2 (b) a = 2, b = 4.5, aˆ = 1, bˆ = 2
Figure 6. Equilibrium business models.
competitive pressure from the outside OS project. For the same reason, the firm is better
off opening both modules when σ and z are very large.
An important implication of Proposition 2 is that the firm may prefer the proprietary
(closed) business model when there is an outside OS competitor. In the monopoly case
(Section 3), the firm never desired to be completely closed. This was because (i) opening
the extensions was harmless if users did not have a base module with which to combine it
and (ii) there was an innovation benefit when opening a module. When there is competition
from an outside OS project, opening the extensions leads to increased competitive pressure,
making P optimal in some opportunities.
One final issue that we need to address is the possibility of leapfrogging. Leapfrogging
refers to a situation where the outside open source project ends up with quality above that
of the commercial firm’s product. This could happen if aˆ bˆ was close to a b and z was close
to 1. In this case leapfrogging could occur if the firm adopted a proprietary business model.
It is easy to see, however, that leapfrogging never happens in equilibrium. If there was
leapfrogging, the commercial firm would earn zero profits because the open source product
would be of higher quality and given away for free. The commercial firm can easily prevent
leapfrogging by opening a and/or b.
4.2. Open source competitor has modules of higher quality. In the previous section,
we have shown that if aˆ < a and bˆ < b, the firm will never include aˆ nor bˆ in its commercial
product. The following lemma shows that when aˆ > a and bˆ > b, the firm will always embed
both modules in its commercial product.
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Lemma 3. When the modules of the non-strategic open source competitor are of higher
quality than the modules of the firm, the firm will always choose to embed those modules in
its commercial product, i.e. it will always choose the Oaˆbˆ business model.
While the result may seem surprising, it is once again due to complementarity between
the software modules and service. The firm may be tempted not to adopt the open source
modules because doing so increases the quality of the open source product (the consumers
of the firm engross the user base of the open source project, which increases its quality).
However, complementarity implies that the quality of the firm’s product increases relatively
more than that of the open source project: the firm shares now the same user base as the
open source project, the firm’s product is based on higher quality modules, and its value is
multiplied by z > 1.23
4.3. Value creation and value capture. We now compare the different business models
in terms of value creation (V ) and value capture (θ). The functional forms for V and θ are
the same as in Section 3.3. What changes are the values of vo and vc that enter in these
expressions.
4.3.1. The firm has modules of higher quality. Figure 7 compares value creation and value
capture for the different business models for a = 1.5, b = 1.5, z = 1.2 and σ = 0.1. Figure
7a shows a case in which a/aˆ > b/bˆ (aˆ = 1 and bˆ = 1.2), and Figure 7b shows a case in
which a/aˆ < b/bˆ (aˆ = 1.2 and bˆ = 1).
These plots have some features in common with the monopoly case. For example, P is
still the business model with lowest value creation and Oab the model with highest value
creation. Also, Oab is the model with lowest value capture. The mixed models (Ma and Mb)
produce intermediate value creation and capture. However, there are important differences
also. First, the line connecting P with Mb (or Ma) has negative slope indicating that the
mixed models do not dominate P . Second, Ma may be to the north-west of Mb, as in Figure
7b. Clearly, the availability of outside OS modules affects the ranking of business models in
terms of value creation and value capture.
4.3.2. The open source competitor has modules of higher quality. Figure 8 shows the ranking
of business models when the outside OS project has modules of higher quality than those of
the profit-maximizing firm, for a = 2.5, aˆ = 3.5, b = 1.5, bˆ = 3, z = 4, and σ = 0.3.
The plot shows clearly that the Open Source business model (Oaˆbˆ) dominates all other
business models. Thus, the tradeoff between value creation and value capture is completely
23This result could be reversed if the open source modules were incompatible with the firm’s complementary
good or if the different software products were horizontally differentiated.
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(a) a/aˆ > b/bˆ (b) a/aˆ < b/bˆ
Figure 7. Value ranking with competition from a low-quality OS project
broken when the OS competitor has modules of higher quality. Clearly, Oaˆbˆ reaches the
highest isoprofit curve and therefore it is the best business model. In this case, private
choice agrees with socially optimal behavior.
Figure 8. Value ranking with competition from a high-quality OS project
5. Competing through business models
In this section, we study competitive interaction between two firms that choose the business
model through which they would like to compete. Specifically, we consider firms H and L
endowed with modules ai and bi, i ∈ {H,L}. We assume that the modules offered by H are
of higher quality than those offered by L: aH ≥ aL ≥ 1 and bH ≥ bL ≥ 1. The two-period
model that we analyze is the natural generalization of that in Section 4. In the first period
(strategic choices), firms choose business models. In the second period (tactical choices),
firms choose the price at which their products are sold. We consider two alternative timings.
In Subsection 5.1, H chooses business model first and in Subsection 5.2, L is the first mover.
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As it will become apparent in what follows, the model with endogenous business models
for both players is complex. To make progress, we simplify by assuming that z = 1 so
that no additional willingness to pay is derived from service. This assumption reduces the
attractiveness of opening modules. The reason is that the vertical differentiation between
the commercial products and the open source competitors that are set up when base modules
are opened is not as large as it would be if z > 1. Therefore, if we find that it is desirable to
open modules when z = 1, it should be even more desirable if z was greater than 1.
We are able to obtain analytical expressions of profits for each combination of business
models of the two players. However, these expressions are long and intricate. This forces us
to solve the first period of the game (the choice of busines model) numerically. Analytical
solutions are intractable. As we will see, several interesting results can be derived from the
numerical analysis.24
5.1. H moves first. The extensive form game that we study has two periods. Strategic
choices take place in the first period and tactical interaction occurs in the second period.
The first period has two stages. In the first stage, H chooses its business model and in the
second stage L chooses its business model.
As the first mover, H has four business models at its disposal: P , MaH , MbH , and OaHbH .
Because L moves second, there are cases in which it has more than four business models to
choose from. For example, if H chose MaH , then in addition to P , MaL , MbL , and OaLbL ,
L can also choose to compete through MaH or OaHbL . However, whenever the H and L
versions of a given module are open, all consumers will use the H version (because it is
free, compatible, and of higher quality). Therefore, if H competes through model MaH and
L competes through business model MaL , L’s effective model will be MaH as even those
consumers buying L’s product will combine bL with aH .
Therefore, we will assume that whenever both firms open the same module, there is a
de facto adoption of the higher quality one by L’s customers.25 The implication is that,
regardless of the business model choice made by H in the first stage, L effectively has four
business models to choose from.26
The timing of the game is:
(1) H chooses business model.
(2) L chooses business model.
24The Mathematica code is available from the authors.
25Clearly, this is possible because we assume that the modules of different firms are compatible. See Section
2.7 for details.
26More precisely, when H opens module iH (i ∈ {a, b}), from the point of view of L, opening iL or adopting
iH are equivalent strategies. For ease of exposition, we collapse both strategies into one: adoption by L.
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(3) Expectations are formed over the market shares of the different products. Given
these expectations, H and L simultaneously choose prices, pH and pL.
27
(4) Consumers choose their preferred product.
Although we allow firms to be completely open, our assumption that z = 1 implies that
if a firm opened everything, then it would not be able to sell its commercial product at a
positive price because the open source product would be as good as the commercial version.
Therefore, opening both modules is a strictly dominated strategy for both firms and it can
be ignored when solving for the subgame perfect equilibrium of the game.
Figure 9 shows a partial description of the game tree.28 Depending on H and L’s decisions
on what modules to open, there may be two or three products available in the market. Three
products are available when either firm opens module a because an open source competitor
emerges. Otherwise, only two products are available.
Note that in this game H can never push L off the market by opening a and setting up
a high-quality open source competitor. The reason is that L can always adopt the opened
module and have quality at least as high as that of the free open source product. For the
same reason, if H opens a module, L will never choose to open the complementary module.
As a consequence, there are two branches of the game in Figure 9 that will never be part of
an equilibrium: {MaH ,MbL} and {MbH ,MaL}.
We solve for the subgame perfect equilibria recursively. We start by determining consumer
choices and solving the pricing subgame given the business models, and later solve for the
equilibrium business model choices.
5.1.1. Consumer demands and equilibrium prices with two products. If neither firm opens
a base module, consumers choose between two commercial products. Let vi and pi be the
quality and price of the product offered by i ∈ {H,L}. Demands are
qH = 1− pH − pL
vH − vL and qL =
pH − pL
vH − vL −
pL
vL
.
Finding the equilibrium prices and substituting in, we obtain
qH =
2vH
4 vH − vL and qL =
vH
4 vH − vL .
27As in previous sections, the market shares of the different products are taken as given by consumers and
firms when they make their choices. Fulfilled expectations imply that in equilibrium, those expectations are
correct.
28The game tree is partial because we have not written down explicitly the pricing subgame nor the payoff
functions. Moreover, we have not included the strictly dominated strategy of being completely open.
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H
L
L
Pricing subgame 1:  {MaH, MaH}
M
a H
L
Pricing subgame 3:  {MaH, P}
MbH
P
MaH
P
Pricing subgame 4:  {MbH, MaL}
Pricing subgame 6:  {MbH, P}
Pricing subgame 7:  {P, MaL}
Pricing subgame 8:  {P, MbL}
Pricing subgame 9:  {P, P}
Pricing subgame 2:  {MaH, MbL}
Pricing subgame 5:  {MbH, MbH}
MbL
MaL
P
MbH
MaL
P
MbL
Products available
Firm H Firm L Open 
aH (1+ !) bH  aH (1+ !) bL aH (1+ !)
aH (1+ (qH + qO) !) bH aL bL aH (1+ (qH + qO) !)
aH bH (1+ (qH+qL) !) aL bH (1+ (qH+qL) !)
aH bH (1+ qH !) aL bL
aH bH aL (1+ (qL + qO) !) bL 
aH bH aL bL (1+ qL !)
aH bH aL bL
aL (1+ (qL + qO) !)
aH (1+ !) bH  aH (1+ !) bL (1+ qO !)
aH bH (1+ !) aL (1+ qO !) bH (1+ !)
aH (1+ !) bL (1+ qO !)
aL (1+ qO !) bH (1+ !)
Figure 9. The game after elimination of dominated strategies. H moves first.
Equilibrium profits are
piH =
4 v2H (vH − vL)
(4 vH − vL)2 and piL =
vH vL (vH − vL)
(4 vH − vL)2 .
The particular profits in each subgame are obtained by substituting in the corresponding
expressions for product quality, vH and vL, given in Figure 9 and imposing that the firms’
and consumers’ expectations be fulfilled in equilibrium.
Consider, for example, the subgame where H has opened bH and L has adopted bH .
This is the subgame {MbH , MbH}. In this case, vH = aH bH (1 + σ (qeH + qeL)) and vL =
aL bH (1 + σ (q
e
H + q
e
L)), where q
e
i (i ∈ {H,L}) is the expected demand for i. Substituting vH
and vL in the equilibrium demands we have
qH =
2aH
4 aH − aL and qL =
aH
4 aH − aL .
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Fulfilled expectations require qH + qL = q
e
H + q
e
L. Hence,
qeH + q
e
L =
3aH
4 aH − aL .
Substituting in the profit functions we obtain:
piH =
4 a2H bH(aH − aL)(aH(4 + 3 σ)− aL)
(4 aH − aL)3 ,
and
piL =
aH aL bH(aH − aL)(aH(4 + 3 σ)− aL)
(4 aH − aL)3 .
Other cases are solved similarly. The equilibrium expression for qeH + q
e
L is particularly
simple in this example because qH +qL does not depend on q
e
H or q
e
L. More generally, qH +qL
will depend on qe and the resulting expressions for qe and profits are convoluted. This is
why analytical solutions for the first period become intractable and we have to resort to a
numerical analysis.
Regarding leapfrogging, the only subgame where it may occur is when H keeps both
modules closed and L opens bL. Leapfrogging occurs in this subgame when σ is large. Let
σNLF :=
3 (aH bH − aL bL)
aL bL
and σLF :=
3 (aH bH − aL bL)
2 (aL bL)
.
Clearly, 0 < σLF < σNLF . It is not hard to see that when σ > σLF there is an equilibrium
with leapfrogging. Likewise, when σ < σNLF there is an equilibrium without leapfrogging.
Therefore, when σLF < σ < σNLF there are two equilibria. As in previous sections, we
assume that whenever there are multiple equilibria, consumers coordinate to choose the
equilibrium with higher (exogenous) quality. Therefore, when σ < σNLF the equilibrium
that we consider has no leapfrogging.
Allowing for the possibility of leapfrogging is important because H has to determine what
is L’s best response to each strategy it may take. In the game where H moves first, however,
leapfrogging does not occur in equilibrium because H can always prevent it by opening bH
and be at least as well off.
5.1.2. Consumer demands and equilibrium prices with three products. If at least one of the
firms opens its base module a, there may be three products in equilibrium.29 Let vi and pi,
29There are two subgames where even with one of the base modules open, there are only one or two active
products in equilibrium. The subgames are {MaH ,MbL} and {MaL ,MbH}. In these two subgames, L’s
product is of equal quality than the open source product. Therefore, L gets no demand if it sets a positive
price. Moreover, depending on the parameter values, the quality of the open source product may be higher
than that of H’s product. When this happens, there is only one product that obtains positive demand in
equilibrium. As discussed above, these subgames are never played.
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i ∈ {H,L,O} be the quality and price of the different products, where O refers to the open
source product, and pO = 0 (by definition of open source). Demands are
qH = 1− pH − pL
vH − vL , qL =
pH − pL
vH − vL −
pL
vL − vO , and qO =
pL
vL − vO .
After substituting in the equilibrium prices, demands become
qH =
2 (vH − vO)
4 vH − vL − 3 vO , qL =
vH − vO
4 vH − vL − 3 vO , and qO =
vH − vL
4 vH − vL − 3 vO .
Equilibrium profits are
piH =
4 (vH − vO)2 (vH − vL)
(4 vH − vL − 3 vO)2
and
piL =
(vH − vO) (vL − vO) (vH − vL)
(4 vH − vL − 3 vO)2 .
The particular profits in each subgame are obtained by substituting in the corresponding
expressions for product quality, vH , vL, and vO, as given in Figure 9 and imposing that the
firms’ and consumers’ expectations be fulfilled in equilibrium.
As in the previous case, there is one subgame where leapfrogging may occur: {P , MaL}. As
before, there are parameters for which the subgame has equilibria with and without leapfrog-
ging, in which case we select the equilibrium without leapfrogging. While it is important to
consider the possibility of leapfrogging to compute the equilibrium of the complete game,
leapfrogging does not occur in the equilibrium.
Having obtained the continuation profits for each of the nine possible subgames we now
move to studying the first period. The first period has two stages. In the first stage, H
chooses business model. In the second stage, L chooses business model. Thus, in choosing
its business model, H takes into account how L will best respond through its choice of
business models.
5.1.3. Business model choice. Figure 10 shows the equilibrium business model configurations
for different parameter values. To produce the figure, we have set aL = bL, aH = λ aL, and
bH = λ bL, where λ > 1. The larger is λ, the larger is the exogenous quality difference
between the products of firms H and L. The plots have λ on the vertical axis, and the
strength of user innovation σ on the horizontal axis.
The labels inside the regions indicate the equilibrium business model configurations. The
first element corresponds to the business model of the first mover (H in this case), and the
second element corresponds to the second mover. For example, {MbH , P} means that H
has chosen to open bH (mixed source business model with open b) and L has chosen to stay
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Figure 10. Equilibrium regions when H moves first.
closed (proprietary model). Likewise, {MbH ,MbH} means that H has opened bH and L has
adopted bH .
Several features of these plots are worth highlighting:
(1) When λ is low, H opens one of its modules and L does not adopt. The reason is
that when λ is low, the modules of H and L are very similar in quality. Therefore, L
prefers to increase its vertical differentiation with H. Thus, H knows that if it opens
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a module, it will not be adopted by L.30 Therefore, when the products of H and L
are similar, the firms prefer to compete with different business models.
(2) When λ is high but σ is low, H stays closed and L opens bL. H knows that if it
opens a module, it will be adopted by L. The negative competitive effect of L getting
closer in quality is larger than the positive effect of winding up with higher quality
due to increased user innovation. This happens because user innovation is weak and
initial quality differences are large in that region.
(3) There is a small region of intermediate values of λ and σ for which both firms choose
P , the closed business model. This is because the strength of user innovation and
initial differences in quality are such that L would adopt any module opened by H.
Still, L prefers to remain closed when H chooses P because by opening a module in
that case, L becomes too close in quality to H.
(4) For relatively large values of λ and σ, both firms choose a mixed source business
model. This is because user innovation is strong and H prefers to open a module even
if L is expected to adopt, and L prefers to adopt because initial quality differences
are sufficiently large.
(5) When bL is low, firms have more incentives to open b than to open a. As bL increases,
it is more likely that firms will open a. This is because if an open source product (O)
was to arise when bL is low, it would have quality close to that of L’s product. This,
in turn, would imply low prices for L, which would also affect H. When bL is large
the region corresponding to {MbH ,MbH} is completely replaced by {MaH ,MaH}.
(6) There are three business model configurations which never arise in equilibrium:
{MaH ,MbL}, {MbH ,MaL} and {P,MaL}.
5.1.4. Value creation and value capture. Strategic interaction affects the creation and capture
of value associated to the different business models. The trade-off between value creation
and capture depends on the equilibrium under analysis, and several configurations can be
analyzed depending on parameter values. Nevertheless, there are regularities that can be
easily described by studying a particular example. In this section, we focus on H’s actions,
taking into account L’s best response for each possible business model choice.
Figure 11 shows value creation and value capture for both firms for the case of aL = bL = 5,
σ = 0.5, and different values of λ. For each case, value creation and capture for H is
represented with small circles. L is represented with squares.
30This is a well known feature of Shaked and Sutton’s (1982) model of vertical product differentiation. If
quality differences are small, price competition will be strong and will lead to low profits. In this case, both
firms will benefit if the quality differential between their products increases. However, if initial differences
in quality are large, L will benefit from getting (somewhat) closer to H.
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For all values of the parameters, L captures less value than H. We can see that the nature
of the trade-off for H changes as λ increases. For λ = 1.1, there is really no trade-off.
MaH provides higher capture and creation than MbH and P , and even though O gives more
creation than MaH , value capture is 0 under O.
Figure 11. Value capture and value creation.
As λ increases, the trade-off becomes more pronounced. For λ = 1.3, MbH gives more
capture than MaH , and for λ = 1.35 and λ = 1.6, P gives more capture than MaH and MbH .
This means that the trade-off becomes more noticeable as the quality differential between
the firms increases.
5.2. L moves first. We now study the game where L chooses its business model first. The
timing is as follows:
(1) L chooses business model.
(2) H chooses business model.
(3) Expectations are formed over the market shares of the different products. Given
these expectations, H and L simultaneously choose prices, pH and pL.
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(4) Consumers choose their preferred product.
As in the previous case, opening both modules is a strictly dominated strategy, so we
ignore that choice. In addition and as discussed above, if both firms open the same module,
L’s consumers will replace the lower quality module by the higher quality one (because it
is open and freely available) and there will be a de facto adoption of H’s module by L.
Figure 12 displays the partial representation of the game tree. Note that we have labeled
the subgame where L chooses MaL and H chooses MaH as {MaH ,MaH}. This reflects the
fact that although L has chosen to open aL, those individuals that purchase L’s product, will
combine bL with the best base module that is freely available. And that is aH . Therefore,
the business model profile {MaL ,MaH} is in fact {MaH ,MaH}.31
L
H
H
Pricing subgame 1: {MaH, MaH}
M
a L
H
Pricing subgame 3: {MaL, P}
MbL
P
MaH
P
Pricing subgame 4: {MbL, MaH}
Pricing subgame 6: {MbL, P}
Pricing subgame 7: {P, MaH}
Pricing subgame 8: {P, MbH}
Pricing subgame 9: {P, P}
aH (1+ !) bH  aH (1+ !) bL aH (1+ !)
Pricing subgame 2: {MaL, MbH}
Pricing subgame 5: {MbH, MbH}
MbH
MaH
P
MbH
MaH
P
MbH
aL (1+ (qL+qO)!) bH (1+ !) aH bH (1+ !)  
aH bH  aL (1+ (qL+qO)!) bL aL (1+ (qL+qO)!) 
aH (1+ !) bH 
aH bH (1+ (qH+qL)!)  aL bH (1+ (qH+qL)!)  
aH bH  aL bL (1+ qL !)
aH (1+ (qH+qO) !) bH  aL bL aH (1+ (qH+qO) !)
aH bH (1+ qH !)  aL bL   
aH bH  aL bL   
Products available
Firm H Firm L Open 
aL (1+ (qL+qO)!) bH (1+ !) 
aH (1+ !) bL (1+ (qL+qO)!) aH (1+ !) bL (1+ (qL+qO)!) 
Figure 12. The game where L moves first after elimination of dominated
strategies.
31The same applies to the game where L chooses MbL and H chooses MbH .
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As in the model where H chooses first, depending on L and H’s business model choices,
two or three products will compete to attract customers in the second period.32 In contrast
to the game where H chooses first, however, in this game even if three products are available
in the second stage, in equilibrium it may be the case that only one or two of these products
winds up receiving positive demand.
For example, consider the subgame where L has opened aL and H has opened bH . In prin-
ciple, there are three products available for customers to choose: the (commercial) products
of firms L and H and the open source product that combines the opened aL and bH . In this
case, however, if pL > 0, L’s product gets no demand because it has the same quality as the
open product which is given away for free. Also, if σ is large, then the open source product
will be of higher quality than the product offered by H.
In Figure 12, we have enumerated the different subgames. Before solving for the equilib-
rium, we should point out the following features of the game:
(1) O leapfrogs L: L is pushed out of the market only when the quality of the open
source product is higher than that of L’s product. In subgame 7, O may leapfrog L.
(2) O leapfrogs H: H is pushed out of the market only when the quality of the open
source product is higher than that of H’s product. In subgames 2, 3 and 4, O may
leapfrog H.
(3) L leapfrogs H: In subgames 2, 3, 4 and 6, L may leapfrog H. When L leapfrogs H,
but O does not, H is not pushed out the market.
(4) No leapfrogging: Leapfrogging (either L over H, O over L, or O over H) may occur
in subgames 2, 3, 4, 6, and 7. In subgames 1, 5, 8, and 9 there is no leapfrogging.
As usual, we solve the game recursively. Because there are so many subgames with po-
tential leapfrogging and so many possible equilibrium product configurations, this game is
harder to solve than the one of Section 5.1.
First, we solve the second period. As we just discussed, the number of products in equi-
librium depends on each business model configuration. There are four possibilities: (i) one
open product, (ii) one open and one commercial product, (iii) two commercial products, and
(iv) one open and two commercial products (three products). In case (i), both firms have
zero-profits. We have analyzed case (ii) in Sections 3.1 and 3.2. Finally, cases (iii) and (iv)
correspond to our analysis in Section 5.1.
32In some subgames, there are parameter values for which there are multiple equilibria. In these cases, we
have selected (a) the equilibrium with the largest number of products and (b) the equilibrium in which H
gets more demand.
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Once we have the continuation profits for the nine subgames, we proceed to solve numer-
ically for the first period outcomes (choice of business model). We present the equilibrium
regions for different parameter values in the following section.
5.2.1. Business model choice. Figure 13 shows the equilibrium business model configurations
for different parameter values. As in the previous section, we have set aL = bL, aH = λ aL,
and bH = λ bL, where λ > 1.
Figure 13. Equilibrium regions when L moves first
The labels inside the regions indicate the equilibrium business model configuration. The
first element in the label corresponds to L, the first mover. For example, {MbL , P} means
that L has chosen to open bL and H has chosen to stay closed. Therefore, {MbL , P} when L
moves first is equivalent to {P,MbL} when H moves first (given the same parameters, both
of them generate the same equilibrium demands and payoffs).
Several features of these plots are worth underlining:
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(1) When λ is low and/or σ is low the equilibrium has one mixed source firm and one
proprietary firm. When λ is low, firms do not want to get too close in quality because
of the harsh price competition that ensues when products are not too differentiated.
This means that only one firm can take advantage of user innovation when λ is low.
The intuition why when σ is low and λ is large there is one mixed source firm and
one proprietary firm is that if H opened a module, it would be adopted by L and the
products would become insufficiently differentiated (from H’s viewpoint).33
(2) There are two cases in which L will be the unique mixed source firm: when λ is large,
but σ is small, and when λ is very small (close to 1). In the first case, L opens bL,
but H does not want to open bH because the effect of L getting closer in quality is
larger than the effect of higher quality due to user innovation. In the second case, L
opens some module, and leapfrogs H, but H prefers to stay as the lower quality firm,
with a larger quality differential, rather than overtaking L and having very similar
quality.
(3) When λ and σ are relatively high, both firms choose to be mixed source. The initial
quality differential is very large, so L wants to get closer in quality to H. On the
other hand, user innovation is significant and both firms want to take advantage of
the increase in quality from opening some module.
(4) When aL and bL are small, firms prefer to open b rather than a. As aL and bL
increase, it is more likely that firms will open a. The reason is that when firms open
a an open source product arises, and if bL is small this open source product would
have a similar quality to L’s product. This, in turn, would imply low prices for L,
which would also affect H.
5.2.2. Value creation and value capture. As in the previous case, the trade-off between value
creation and value capture is affected by the strategic interaction between the two firms. In
this section, we focus on the effects of L’s actions, taking into account H’s best response for
each possible action.
Figure 14 shows value creation and value capture for both firms for the case of aL = bL = 3,
σ = 0.5, and different values of λ. For each case, value capture for H is represented with
small circles, and value capture for L is represented with squares.
A first result is that when L plays first, it may capture more value than H. This will
happen when λ is very close to 1, so that both firms are very similar. In this case, if L
33Having understood that when λ is low the equilibrium has one mixed source firm and one proprietary firm
regardless of the value of σ, we need only consider low σ when λ is high.
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decides to open some module first, H will decide to remain closed, and as a result L will
leapfrog H.
An interesting result is that when λ is small, there is room for only one mixed source firm
in the market. We can see that if L decides to remain closed, H will open aH , but if L opens
some module, H will react by remaining completely closed.
We can also see that for small λ, opening aL gives higher value capture and value creation
than opening bL, so there is no trade-off. For larger values of λ, opening bL gives higher
value capture, so a trade-off between the two mixed source business models arises.
Figure 14. Value capture and value creation.
5.3. Comparison of the two timings. The two games analyzed above have important
differences. First, leapfrogging may occur in equilibrium when L plays first. Second, when L
plays first, the area in which both firms choose the proprietary business model P disappears.
Therefore, when L plays first, it is more likely that we have at least one firm competing
through a mixed source business model. Third, the area with open a is smaller than when
H plays first. This is because L prefers a world with open b rather than open a. Finally, the
equilibrium region where both firms open b is larger when L moves first.
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6. Managerial implications
We have set up and analyzed a model to better understand the optimal choice of busi-
ness model in industries where technological openness and user innovation are important.
Our theoretical development provides a formal base on which to build recommendations for
management practice. Our propositions, however, may be difficult to interpret by managers
because of the inherent complexity of the formal model. We now present simplified ver-
sions of our main results through easily accessible matrices. In each case, we discuss what
drives our propositions and lemmas and present policy recommendations that can be directly
applied to the design of optimal business strategies.
6.1. Monopoly. The firm will in general choose to be open: when there are no competing
products in the market, there is little harm in opening those technologies which have no
standalone value. Thus, the firm will prefer to open the extensions even if the value of
service and user innovation are low. Still, there are situations where the firm may find
it optimal to open the core or to become completely open. This will happen when user
innovation and the value of the complementary good are high. In this case the firm will
want to build a strong user base and profit from selling the complementary good.
Figure 15 (a stylized version of Figure 4) shows the business policy recommendation for
different degrees of the value of service and user innovation. The firm should choose to be
open source when service and user innovation are high, and should choose a mixed source
business model when either service or user innovation, or both, are low.
Figure 15. Optimal business model in the monopoly case.
Our findings show the relevance of the mixed source open extensions business model,
which is an inexpensive way to become open. Microsoft’s .Net framework and Stata are
two examples. In the first case, Microsoft is committed to opening the languages that can
be compiled with .Net (Visual Basic, C#, J#, et cetera), even to the point of promoting
open standards. Users of those languages, however, need .Net (which is kept proprietary)
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to compile the code that they develop. Likewise, StataCorp has opened hundreds of ado
files, which are programs that implement econometric techniques used to perform specific
tasks (such as Maximum Likelihood estimations for particular econometric models). While
the ado files are open, users need to use Stata (which is kept proprietary) to compile those
programs.
6.2. Competing against a non-profit Open Source project. The presence of an open
source alternative affects the optimal decisions of the firm. Our first finding is that the firm
should embed the modules of the open source project when they have higher quality. The
result is due to complementarity between the software modules and service.
An example is IBM’s support of Linux. IBM had several competing operating systems
(like Z/OS), but it began supporting Linux because it was of higher quality, had a growing
user base, and it could profit from selling Linux related support and consultancy services.
Currently, IBM provides support for over 500 software products running on Linux, and has
more than 15,000 Linux-related customers worldwide.34
When the outside OS project is of lower quality than the firm’s product, the optimal
course of action depends on the extent of user innovation and the value of the complementary
good/service. Figure 16 shows a stylized version of Figures 6a and 6b. As in the monopoly
case, the firm should choose the open source model when user innovation and value of service
are high. The firm should compete with a mixed source model when user innovation is
intermediate or high. In contrast to monopoly, however, the firm should remain proprietary
when user innovation is low.
Therefore, the firm will sometimes react to competition from a non-profit open source
competitor by becoming more closed. This result questions the conventional wisdom that
firms will always react to open source by becoming more open.
Figure 16. Competition with a non-profit Open Source project.
34See http://www.ibm.com/linux/ (accessed May 12, 2009).
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Which module should the firm open when choosing the mixed source business model? The
prescription is unambiguous: always open the module that faces stronger competition from
the outside OS project.
6.3. Competition between for-profit, commercial firms. In this case, the optimal
strategy depends on whether the firm has the higher or the lower quality product and on
whether the firm is the leader or the follower in choosing its business model. Figures 17a and
17b show the optimal business model for both firms (these are stylized versions of Figures
10 and 13). In every cell, the business model at the top corresponds to the firm moving first
and the one at the bottom to the firm moving second. For example, when the low-quality
firm moves first, it should choose the proprietary business model and the high-quality firm
the mixed source model when user innovation is low and the vertical product differentiation
is intermediate.
(a) High-quality firm moves first (b) Low-quality firm moves first
Figure 17. Optimal business model in the strategic duopoly case.
As we can see in both figures, when the initial quality difference or user innovation are low,
one firm should compete with the proprietary business model and the other will be mixed
source. When the quality difference and user innovation are high, however, both firms should
compete with the same mixed business model.
While Figures 17a and 17b are similar, there is an important difference: if the firm with
lower quality chooses business model first, it may end up leapfrogging the quality of the other
firm’s product. This happens when the initial quality difference is low. In this case, both
firms prefer to move first and the market outcome depends on which firm is more agile to
respond to the opportunity presented by open source. Moreover, when the low quality firm
moves first, the equilibrium area in which both firms choose the proprietary business model
disappears. The market tends to be more open when firms with lower quality products are
more agile than firms with high quality products.
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The duopoly case provides support for the observation that firms react to changes in their
competitors business models by adapting their own business models. A relevant example
is the case of IBM and JBoss.35 Both firms were competing in the middleware segment.36
Initially, IBM was proprietary, but JBoss started gaining market share using an open source
model and selling complementing proprietary software and support services. To respond,
IBM bought a small firm called Gluecode that was developing proprietary extensions over
the open source middleware project Apache Geronimo. In a move aimed at reducing the user
base of JBoss, IBM completely opened Gluecode’s software. Interestingly, IBM maintained
more advanced middleware programs proprietary. The example clearly illustrates the notion
of competition through business models introduced in Section 5.
35See http://www.forbes.com/2005/06/15/jboss-ibm-linux_cz_dl_0615jboss.html (accessed Septem-
ber 11, 2009).
36Middleware is software which is used as a bridge to connect other programs, and is one of the most
important market segments in the software industry.
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7. Concluding remarks
We have analyzed a model where firms with modular software must decide which modules
to open and which to keep proprietary. We have allowed firms to choose between two
“pure” business models (open source and proprietary) and two “mixed” models (open core
and open extensions). We have considered three different industry structures: a monopoly
benchmark, competition between a for-profit firm against a non-profit OS project, and a
strategic duopoly. The analysis has delivered several novel findings which can be directly
applied to the design of optimal business strategies. Given the recent outburst of attention
on open business models, the topic deserves further study. The obvious next step is relaxing
two convenient, though limiting, important assumptions: software compatibility and the
absence of horizontal differentiation.
The paper contributes to the recent literature in strategy that analyzes competitive inter-
actions between organizations with different business models. Interest in this line of research
has increased in the past decade as new technologies, regulatory changes, and new customer
demands have allowed firms to implement new approaches to competing in a wide range
of industries spanning from airlines (e.g., Ryanair) to furniture (e.g., IKEA) and from the
circus (e.g., Cirque du Soleil) to betting (e.g., Betfair). In fact, many of the fastest-growing
firms in the recent past appear to have taken advantage of opportunities sparked by glob-
alization, deregulation, or technological change to “compete differently” and to innovate in
their business models (see Kim and Mauborgne (2005) and Markides (2008) for additional
examples).
Where do the business models that we observe come from? Our contention is that, to a
large extent, the configuration of business models in an industry is the equilibrium outcome
of a search process for higher profits. We have proposed and illustrated a methodology for
the study of endogenous business models; a two-period game where in the first period (the
strategy period) business models are chosen and in the second period (the tactics period)
firms interact by making tactical choices as allowed by their models. By choosing particular
business models, firms are committing to the tactical subgames that will ultimately deter-
mine the profits that they will earn. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first paper
in the strategy literature where firms interacting in the market place, in addition to best
responding to each other through tactical choices (such as prices), compete by reconfiguring
their business models.37
37Casadesus-Masanell and Zhu (2009) consider business model reconfigurations by one firm only. In the
present paper, both competitors business models are endogenous.
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Our approach to modeling competition through business models has similarities with the
biform games introduced by Brandenburger and Stuart (2007). A biform game is a two-
period game in which players first make strategic choices that determine the second period
cooperative game that ensues. The first period is the strategy period where the bounds of
the tactical subgame are set. The difference between our approach and biform games is that
our second period is a noncooperative game. Therefore, the size of the final “pie of value”
in our setting depends on the first period business model choices and on the equilibrium
tactical interaction. In the biform game formulation, the size of the pie is determined by the
first period choices and it remains fixed in the second period.
One significant implication of our approach to modeling the second period is the following.
In Brandenburger and Stuart (2007), the larger the value created in the strategy period,
the better off all firms end up because every unit of value created winds up being shared
between all industry participants in the second period (in exogenously given proportions).
In our formulation, however, larger value created in the strategy period does not imply
improved value capture for all participants because (i) the equilibrium of the tactical game
is generally not efficient; and (ii) the bargaining power of the different firms in the second
period depends on the business models chosen. As a consequence, and as pointed out by
Salas-Fumas (2009), the advice “choose your business model to create and capture as much
value as possible” does not apply generally. As our results show, value creation and value
capture need not be positively correlated. Perhaps better advice for profit-maximizing firms
competing through business models is: “choose your business model to capture as much
value as possible, taking into account the likely strategic and tactical reactions of other firms
with which you will interact.”
The generic two-period game that we have presented can be applied to all sorts of com-
petitive settings such as strategies to fight ad-sponsored rivals, strategies to fight low cost
entrants, strategies to fight platform players, and the like. We hope that our analysis of
mixed source is helpful to researchers and practitioners willing to consider competition be-
yond tactics and to have provided a solid first step towards a general framework for the
study of competition through business models.
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Appendix A: Proofs of Propositions and Lemmas in Text
Proposition 1. Suppose that either 2 < b < 3 and z ≤ 2(3−b)b , or b ≥ 3 hold. Then, if σ ≤ σa|b,
Mb is the optimal business model; if σa|b < σ ≤ σa|ab, Ma is the optimal business model; and if
σ > σa|ab, the optimal business model is O. Suppose, instead, that either 2 < b < 3 and z > 2(3−b)b ,
or 1 ≤ b ≤ 2 hold. Then, if σ ≤ σb|ab, Mb is the optimal business model; and if σ > σb|ab, O is the
optimal business model.
Proof. The thresholds
σa|b :=
2
b z − 2 , σa|ab :=
b− 1
b(z − 1) , σb|ab :=
1 +
√
z (9 z − 8)
4 (z − 1) −
3
4
are such that:
pia > pib if and only if σ > σa|b,
pia > piab if and only if σ < σa|ab,
pib > piab if and only if σ < σb|ab.
We study the six possible orders between the thresholds, taking into account that σ > 0, b > 1,
and z > 1.
A little algebra shows that the only two possibilities are: σa|ab < σb|ab < σa|b and σa|b < σb|ab <
σa|ab. The other four rankings are impossible, given our assumptions on the values that the model
parameters may take. Let’s consider the two possible orders separately.
Case 1: σa|ab < σb|ab < σa|b. This happens when 1 < b ≤ 2 and z > 2b or 2 < b < 3 and
z > 2
3b−b2 . Figure 18 illustrates this situation.
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Figure 18. σa|ab < σb|ab < σa|b.
Case 2: σa|b < σb|ab < σa|ab. This happens when 2 < b < 3 and 1 < z < 23b−b2 or when b ≥ 3.
Figure 19 illustrates this situation.
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Figure 19. σa|b < σb|ab < σa|ab.
Lemma 1. When the modules of the firm are of higher quality than those of a non-strategic open
source competitor, the firm will never choose to embed those modules in its commercial product, i.e.
the firm will never choose the Maˆ, Mbˆ, Oabˆ, Oaˆb, or Oaˆbˆ business models.
Proof. We have to prove that Maˆ, Mbˆ and Oaˆbˆ are always dominated by other model. It will suffice
to compare Maˆ with Ma, Mbˆ with Mb, and Oaˆbˆ with Oab.
We will now prove that Maˆ is dominated by Ma for all parameter values. In any of the two
business models, in equilibrium 1/2 of the users consume the commercial product, and 1/2 of
the users choose the open source product. With the first business model, the firm’s product has
quality vc = aˆ(1 + σ) b z and the open source product has quality vo = aˆ(1 + σ) bˆ(1 + σ/2). Profits
are aˆ(1 + σ) (b z − bˆ(1 + σ/2)). With the second business model, the firm’s product has quality
vc = a(1 + σ) b z and the open source product has quality vo = a(1 + σ) bˆ(1 + σ/2). Profits become
a(1 + σ) (b z − bˆ(1 + σ/2)). Clearly profits are higher under Ma because a > aˆ. Even though the
open source product increases its quality when the firm open its product, in comparison with the
case in which it adopts the inferior OS module, the quality of the commercial product increases
even more, because of its complementarity with b and z.
The proofs for Mbˆ and Oaˆbˆ follow the same steps, appropriately redefining the firm profits in
each case.
Lemma 2. Ma is preferred to Mb if and only if a/aˆ < b/bˆ, and vice versa.
Proof. To see this, note that profits under Ma and Mb are, respectively, pia = (ao b z− ao bˆo)/4 and
pib = (a bo z − aˆo bo)/4. The result follows directly from observing that ao b z := a bo z. Hence, the
comparison is between ao bˆo and aˆ bo or, more simply, between a bˆ and aˆ b.
Proposition 2 (Equilibrium regions). If a/aˆ < b/bˆ, then P is optimal when z < za|p, Ma is
optimal when za|p < z < zab|a and Oab is optimal when z > zab|a. If a/aˆ > b/bˆ, then P is optimal
when z < zb|p, Mb is optimal when zb|p < z < zab|b and Oab is optimal when z > zab|b.
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Proof. It is easy to see that:
pia > pip if and only if z >
bˆ(2 + σ)(2a(1 + σ)− aˆ(2 + σ))
4 a b σ
:= za|p,
pib > pip if and only if z >
aˆ(2 + σ)(2b(1 + σ)− bˆ(2 + σ))
4 a b σ
:= zb|p,
piab > pia if and only if z >
2b(1 + σ)− bˆ(2 + σ)
2 b σ
:= zab|a,
piab > pib if and only if z >
2a(1 + σ)− aˆ(2 + σ)
2 a σ
:= zab|b.
Given this, the proposition follows from Lemma 2 and a straightforward comparison of the thresh-
olds presented above.
Lemma 3. When the modules of the non-strategic open source competitor are of higher quality
than the modules of the firm, the firm will always choose to embed those modules in its commercial
product, i.e. it will always choose the Oaˆbˆ business model.
Proof. With any business model, if the commercial product ends up with lower quality than the
open source product in equilibrium, it has zero demand and thus firm’s profit become zero. The
firm will then adopt some or all of the OS modules. Therefore, we can concentrate on the case
in which z is large enough, so that the commercial product would have higher quality than the
open source product in equilibrium if the firm were to choose a business model other than Oaˆbˆ.
In equilibrium, then, the commercial product and the open source product have each 1/2 of the
market. This means that if the firm adopts an OS module, the user innovation term of any module
will be (1 + σ), whereas if the firm does not adopt the OS module the user innovation term is
(1 + σ/2). Therefore, when the firm adopts the module, there are two effects: (1) the commercial
product increases quality because it changes modules from a or b to aˆ or bˆ, which have higher
quality, (2) the commercial product and the open source product increase quality because the user
innovation term for each module goes from (1+σ/2) to (1+σ). However, the second effect is higher
for the firm, because it gets multiplied by z > 1. Clearly, the firm will benefit from adopting both
OS modules.
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Appendix B: Multiproduct Monopolist
In our analysis of the monopolist, we have imposed that the firm offers one commercial product
only. Moreover, we have assumed that the product that the firm commercializes is composed of
the base module, the extensions, and service. Because the independent modules and service are
available to the monopolist for separate commercialization, one question that arises is whether the
monopolist prefers to offer more than one commercial product.
The answer turns out to be negative: even if we allowed the monopolist to sell more than one
product, she will choose to offer only the product that we have considered: a base with extensions
and service.
Lemma 4. If we let the monopolist choose how many commercial products to sell, she will choose
to offer one product only. Moreover, the chosen product is the one that we have considered in
Section 3.
Proof. We consider all possible product combinations available to the monopolist.
Case 1: Monopoly with four products. The monopoly offers the base module at price p1, the base
module together with the set of extensions at price p2, the base module with service at price p3,
and the complete package (base module, extensions, and service) at price p4.
Let the qualities of the three products be v1, v2, v3, and v4. Clearly, 0 < v1 < v2 < v3 < v4. The
demand functions for each of the products are:
q1 =
p2 − p1
v2 − v1 −
p1
v1
q2 =
p3 − p2
v3 − v2 −
p2 − p1
v2 − v1
q3 =
p4 − p3
v4 − v3 −
p3 − p2
v3 − v2
q4 = 1− p4 − p3
v4 − v3
Profits are pi1,2,3,4 = q1 p1 + q2 p2 + q3 p3 + q4 p4. Solving the system of three first-order conditions
yields:
p1 =
v1
2
, p2 =
v2
2
, p3 =
v3
2
, and p4 =
v4
2
.
Substituting in the demand functions, we obtain: q1 = 0, q2 = 0, q3 = 0, and q4 = 12 . Therefore,
the profit-maximizing monopolist prefers to offer the complete product only.
Case 2: Monopoly with three products. The monopoly offers the base module at price p1, the base
module together with the set of extensions or the base module with service at price p2, and the
complete package (base module, extensions, and service) at price p3.
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Let the qualities of the three products be v1, v2, and v3. Clearly, 0 < v1 < v2 < v3. The demand
functions for each of the products are:
q1 =
p2 − p1
v2 − v1 −
p1
v1
q2 =
p3 − p2
v3 − v2 −
p2 − p1
v2 − v1
q3 = 1− p3 − p2
v3 − v2
Profits are pi1,2,3 = q1 p1 + q2 p2 + q3 p3. Solving the system of three first-order conditions yields:
p1 =
v1
2
, p2 =
v2
2
, and p3 =
v3
2
.
Substituting in the demand functions, we obtain: q1 = 0, q2 = 0, and q3 = 12 . Therefore, the
profit-maximizing monopolist prefers to offer the complete product only.
Case 3: Monopoly with two products. There are several combinations of two products that the
monopolist may offer. In the analysis that we are now conducting, they are all equivalent. For
example, the firm may offer the base module at price p1 and the base module together with the set
of extensions at price p2. Or it may offer the base module at price p1 and the base module together
with the set of extensions and service at price p2.
Let the qualities of the two products be v1 and v2. Clearly, 0 < v1 < v2. The demand functions
for each of the products are:
q1 =
p2 − p1
v2 − v1 −
p1
v1
q2 = 1− p2 − p1
v2 − v1
Profits are pi1,2 = q1 p1 + q2 p2. The profit-maximizing solution has: q1 = 0 and q2 = 12 . Once again,
the profit-maximizing monopolist prefers to offer the complete product only.
Case 4: Monopoly with two products when there is an open source alternative. This case corresponds
to the monopolist opening module a, which sets up an OS competitor, and fighting the open source
alternative with two, rather than one commercial product. The two products are: the base module
with the set of extensions sold at p1, and the complete product (base module, extensions, and
service) sold at p2.
Let the quality of the open source product be vo and those of the commercial products be v1
and v2. Clearly, 0 < vo < v1 < v2. The demand functions for each of the commercial products are:
q1 =
p2 − p1
v2 − v1 −
p1
v1 − v0
q2 = 1− p2 − p1
v2 − v1
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Profits are pi1,2 = q1 p1 + q2 p2. The profit-maximizing solution has: q1 = 0 and q2 = 12 . Once again,
the profit-maximizing monopolist prefers to offer the complete product only. The free open sorce
product obtains a market share of 12 .
Case 5: Monopoly with three products when there is an open source alternative. This last case
corresponds to the monopolist opening module a, which sets up an OS competitor, and fighting the
open source alternative with three commercial products. The three products are: the base module
with the set of extensions sold at p1, the base module with service sold at p2, and the complete
product (base module, extensions, and service) sold at p3. Following the same steps as in the above
cases, it is easy to see that the profit-maximizing monopolist prefers to offer the complete product
only.
Appendix C: Alternative Competitive Scenarios
In this appendix, we analyze alternative scenarios when there is a non-profit open source com-
petitor for the products of the firm.
7.1. Preliminaries: Relevant business models. The possibility of adoption of the modules
provided by the outside OS project means that there are multiple implementations of the mixed
and open source business models. The possibilities are: Ma, Maˆ, Mb, Mbˆ, Oab, Oaˆb, Oabˆ, and Oaˆbˆ.
The following lemma says that given the values of a, aˆ, b, and bˆ, only one implementation of each
business model is relevant.
Lemma 5. When choosing between Mi and Oij (i, j ∈ {a, aˆ, b, bˆ}, i 6= j) business models, the
profit-maximizing firm will never choose models embedding modules of lower quality. If aˆ > a
(aˆ ≤ a), the firm will never choose an Mi or Oij business model that uses a (aˆ). Likewise, if bˆ > b
(bˆ ≤ b), the firm will never choose an Mi or Oij business model that uses b (bˆ).
Proof. There are many cases depending on which modules are provided by the OS project. The
continuation profit for the incumbent is always (vc − vo)/4, but the specific values of vc and vo
depend on the case under analysis.
For ease of exposition, we will decompose quality into two parts: vc = mc kc and vo = mo ko.
mc and mo depend on whether the OS module has been adopted or not. kc > 1 and ko ≥ 1 are
constants that do not change regardless of adoption of the OS module. For example, suppose that
aˆ > a and that the firm is opening b, with b ≤ bˆ. We are interested in comparing the payoffs
of adopting aˆ with those of opening a. If the firm opens a, then vc = a(1 + σ/2)b(1 + σ)z, and
vo = aˆ(1+σ/2)b(1+σ). If the firm adopts aˆ, then vc = aˆ(1+σ)b(1+σ)z, and vo = aˆ(1+σ)b(1+σ).
In this case, kc = b(1 + σ)z and ko = b(1 + σ).
Recall that the user innovation term depends on the expectations of the measure of consumers
using an open module. When the commercial product C and the outside open source product OS
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are based on different open modules, the user innovation term is (1+σ/2) for both products. When
C and OS share the same open module, the user innovation term becomes (1 + σ).
The decomposition vc = mc kc and vo = mo ko allows us to classify every possible case into one
of three possibilities:
(1) aˆ > a or aˆ ≤ a, for any value of b and bˆ.
(2) bˆ > b or bˆ ≤ b, when aˆ exists or a is open.
(3) bˆ > b or bˆ ≤ b, when aˆ does not exist and a is not open.
We analyze each case separately.
Case 1: aˆ > a or aˆ ≤ a, for any value of b and bˆ.
Suppose aˆ > a. We do not impose any restrictions on b and bˆ: b may be open or closed, there
may be a bˆ or not, and bˆ may be larger or smaller than b if the former exists. If the firm opens a,
vc = a(1 +σ/2)kc and vo = aˆ(1 +σ/2)ko. If the firm adopts aˆ, vc = aˆ(1 +σ)kc and vo = aˆ(1 +σ)ko.
Clearly, the firm will always adopt aˆ. Suppose now that aˆ ≤ a. If the firm opens a, vc = a(1 +σ)kc
and vo = a(1 + σ)ko. If the firm adopts aˆ, vc = aˆ(1 + σ)kc and vo = aˆ(1 + σ)kc. In this case,
the firm will open a. Therefore, if the firm is considering a MS or OS model with open a, it will
include the higher quality module in its commercial version.
Case 2: bˆ > b or bˆ ≤ b, when aˆ exists or a is open.
The proof is essentially the same as that of case 1.
Case 3: bˆ > b or bˆ ≤ b, when aˆ does not exist and a is not open.
In this case, if the firm opens b, then vc = b(1 + σ/2)kc and vo = 0. If the firm adopts bˆ, then
vc = bˆ(1 + σ)kc and vo = 0. Therefore, if the firm is considering a MS or OS model with either
b or bˆ open, it will choose the model with bˆ. The opposite result is obtained when bˆ < b. This
concludes the proof.
Lemma 5 offers a powerful simplification: the firm will only consider four business models. For
example, if aˆ > a and bˆ ≤ b or bˆ does not exist, the firm will only consider P , Maˆ, Mb and Oaˆb; if
bˆ > b and aˆ ≤ a or aˆ does not exist, the firm will only consider P , Ma, Mbˆ and Oabˆ; and so on.
Of course, Lemma 1 (in the main text) is a particular case of the more general Lemma 5. The
intuition is the same as before, complementarity implies that the firm always benefits more than
the open source project from adopting superior modules.
Having established this helpful result, we move on to analyzing the cases that may arise. We
first study the case of competition by a low-quality outside OS project. We consider two cases:
(1) the entrant competes with a base module only, and (2) the entrant competes with the set of
extensions only. Recall that we have analyzed the case in which the entrant competes with both
modules in the main text.
7.2. Outside OS project competes with base module aˆ ≤ a. We begin studying the case
where the outside OS project consists only of a base module aˆ which is of lower quality than the
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firm’s corresponding module a. Regardless of the business model chosen by the firm, consumers
have the option of consuming an OS product with value vo > 0. However, the firm affects vo
through its choice of business model. For example, if the firm decides not to open any modules,
then vo = aˆo. If the firm opens module a, then vo = ao because aˆ ≤ a and all consumers prefer
the firm’s open module. If the firm opens module b only, then vo = aˆo bo because full compatibility
implies that consumers may combine modules from different developers. Finally, if the firm opens
both a and b, then vo = ao bo.
The firm’s profits are (vc − vo)/4, where vc is the value of the commercial product. Lemma
5 states that the firm will never adopt aˆ. Therefore the four business models that the firm will
consider, the corresponding values vc and vo, and profits are:
P : vc = a b z, vo = aˆo, and pip = (a b z − aˆo)/4.
Ma: vc = ao b z, vo = ao, and pia = ao (b z − 1)/4.
Mb: vc = a bo z, vo = aˆo bo, and pib = (a bo z − aˆo bo)/4.
Oab: vc = ao bo z, vo = ao bo, and piab = ao bo (z − 1)/4.
Contrary to the monopoly case, Mb does not dominate P . The reason is that when b is opened,
users of the open source project can combine aˆ with b to assemble a product of quality aˆo bo.
Having a stronger open source competitor may lead to decreased value capture by the for-profit
firm. We begin by comparing Ma and Mb. The following lemma states that there is a thresold σa|b
independent of z such that Ma is preferred to Mb if and only if σ > σa|b.
Lemma 6. Let σa|b := 2
(
a
aˆ b − 1
)
. When σ > σa|b, then Ma is preferred to Mb, and if the opposite
happens, Mb is preferred to Ma. In particular, if b > a/aˆ, then Mb is never optimal.
Proof. Ma is preferred to Mb when pia > pib, that is, when ao (b z − 1)/4 > (a bo z − aˆo bo)/4.
Rearranging this inequality we obtain the desired result. The opposite result is obtained similarly.
The intuition behind this result is similar to that behind Lemma 2. The firm prefers to open the
module which adds less value to the outside OS product. An implication of Lemma 6 is that when
σ > σa|b, the firm considers (at most) P , Ma, and Oab as candidates to an optimal business model.
And when σ < σa|b, it considers (at most) P , Mb, and Oab.
We now fully characterize the firm’s choice of business model. The following are helpful for
Proposition 3:
za|p :=
2 a (1 + σ)− aˆ (2 + σ)
2 a b σ
, zb|p :=
aˆ (2 + σ) (b (1 + σ)− 1)
2 a b σ
,
zab|a := 1 +
b− 1
b σ
, and zab|b :=
2 a (1 + σ)− aˆ (2 + σ)
2 a σ
.
vi CASADESUS-MASANELL AND LLANES
Proposition 3 (Equilibrium regions). If σ > σa|b, then P is optimal when z < za|p, Ma is optimal
when za|p < z < zab|a and Oab is optimal when z > zab|a. If σ < σa|b, P is optimal when z < zb|p,
Mb is optimal when zb|p < z < zab|b and O is optimal when z > zab|b.
Proof. Noticing that
pia > pip if and only if z >
2a(1 + σ)− aˆ(2 + σ)
2a b σ
:= za|p,
pib > pip if and only if z >
aˆ(2 + σ)(b(1 + σ)− 1)
2 a b σ
:= zb|p,
piab > pia if and only if z > 1 +
b− 1
b σ
:= zab|a,
piab > pib if and only if z >
2a(1 + σ)− aˆ(2 + σ)
2 a σ
:= σab|b.
this Proposition follows from Lemma 6 and a straightforward profit comparison.
Proposition 3 describes how the choice of business model varies with σ and z. For low values
of σ and z, the firm chooses the proprietary business model (P ), for intermediate values, the firm
chooses a mixed source model (either Ma or Mb), and for high values of σ and z, the firm becomes
completely open (Oab). Figure 20 shows the regions for different parameter values.
(a) a = 4.8, b = 2, aˆ = 2 (b) a = 3.8, b = 2, aˆ = 2
Figure 20. Equilibrium business models.
It is interesting to note the similarity of this case with the case in which the firm competes with
both modules. What is really important behind these two cases is that there is an outside base
module which can be combined with the extensions of the firm, if it decides to open them.
As a final remark, note that leapfrogging by the open source project will not happen in equilib-
rium. The commercial firm can easily prevent leapfrogging by opening a.
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7.3. Outside OS project competes with add-on module bˆ ≤ b. We now consider the case in
which the outside OS project consists only of extensions which are of lower quality than those of
the profit-maximizing firm.
Because the outside open source project consists of bˆ only, it cannot be used alone; it needs a
base module with which to combine. The implication is that this case is similar to the monopoly
of Section 3 in that if the firm decides not to open the base module, the competitor open source
product has no value and no effect in the market.
The values of vc and vo and profits under each business model in this case are:
P : vc = a b z, vo = 0, and pip = a b z/4.
Ma: vc = ao b z, vo = aobˆo, and pia = (ao b z − ao bˆo)/4.
Mb: vc = a bo z, vo = 0, and pib = (a bo z)/4.
Oab: vc = ao bo z, vo = ao bo, and piab = ao bo (z − 1)/4.
As in the monopoly case (and for the same reason), P is dominated by Mb. This, together with
Lemma 5, implies that the firm needs only consider Ma, Mb, Oab. The following are helpful to
characterize the firm’s choice of business model:
za|b :=
bˆ (1 + σ) (2 + σ)
b σ
, zab|a :=
2 b (1 + σ)− bˆ (2 + σ)
2 b σ
, and zab|b :=
2 (1 + σ)2
σ (3 + 2σ)
.
Proposition 4. If b
bˆ
> (2+σ)(3+2σ)2(1+σ) , then Mb is optimal when z < za|b, Ma is optimal when za|b <
z < za|ab, and Oab is optimal when z > za|ab. If bbˆ <
(2+σ)(3+2σ)
2(1+σ) , then Mb is optimal when z < zb|ab
and Oab is optimal when z > zb|ab. Ma is never optimal when bbˆ <
(2+σ)(3+2σ)
2(1+σ) . Notice that a
sufficient condition is b < 3bˆ.
Proof. As in the monopoly case (and for the same reason), P is dominated by Mb. This, together
with Lemma 5, implies that the firm needs only consider Ma, Mb, Oab. Thus, only three thresholds
are relevant, za|b, zab|a, and zab|b:
pia > pib if and only if z >
bˆ(1 + σ)(2 + σ)
b σ
:= za|b,
piab > pia if and only if z >
2b(1 + σ)− bˆ(2 + σ)
2 b σ
:= zab|a,
piab > pib if and only if z >
2(1 + σ)2
σ(3 + 2σ)
:= zab|b.
If za|b > zab|a, Ma is always dominated by Mb or OS. Rearranging this inequality, we get bbˆ <
(2+σ)(3+2σ)
2(1+σ) . Therefore, if
b
bˆ
< (2+σ)(3+2σ)2(1+σ) , then Ma is never optimal, and the firm will choose
between Mb and Oab. When bbˆ >
(2+σ)(3+2σ)
2(1+σ) , the firm will choose between Ma, Mb and Oab. The
optimal choice is found by comparing the different thresholds.
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The proposition states that depending on the values of σ and z, there may be two or three
optimal business models in equilibrium. For low values of σ and z, the firm opens b. For high
values of σ and z, the firm opens both modules. And for intermediate values of σ, the firm may
consider opening a. Opening a happens only when b is large (more precisely, only when b/bˆ is
large). In this case, although opening a creates a more formidable outside open source competitor,
there is a large increase in the value of the commercial package because of the complementarity
between a and b. If b is low, on the other hand, the firm will prefer to keep a closed to prevent
having to remain a monopoly. Figure 21 illustrates the two situations that may emerge.
(a) a = 2, b = 4, bˆ = 1.5 (b) a = 2, b = 8, bˆ = 1.5
Figure 21. Equilibrium business models.
7.4. Outside OS project competes with either a base module aˆ > a or an add-on module
bˆ > b. In this subsection we consider the simple case in which one of the modules available through
the outside OS project has higher quality than that of the firm.38 Remember that we have already
analyzed the case in which the open source project provides both modules, and both modules have
higher quality than those of the firm in the main text.
The following lemma says that when aˆ > a or bˆ > b, only two business models may arise: one of
the two mixed models (Maˆ or Mbˆ) and the open source model (Oaˆbˆ).
Lemma 7. If aˆ > a and bˆ ≤ b or bˆ does not exist, the firm will choose Maˆ or Oaˆb. If bˆ > b and
aˆ ≤ a or aˆ does not exist, the firm will choose Mbˆ or Oabˆ.
Proof. There are many cases, depending on the modules offered by the OS project. Remember that
profits are always (vc− vo)/4, but the exact form of vc and vo change with the case under analysis.
Suppose first that aˆ > a. We assume nothing regarding b: b may be open or closed, bˆ may exist
or not, and if it exists bˆ may be larger than b or not. If the firm does not adopt aˆ, vc = a kc and
38The other module may not be offered by the outside OS project or it may be of lower quality.
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vo = aˆ(1 + σ/2)ko, where kc > 1 and ko ≥ 1 are constants which do not depend on the decision to
adopt aˆ (for example, if bˆ < b and b is not open, kc = b z and ko = bˆ(1 + σ/2)). If the firm adopts
aˆ, then vc = aˆ(1 + σ)kc and vo = aˆ(1 + σ)ko. Clearly, the firm will always adopt aˆ whenever aˆ > a.
Suppose now that bˆ > b, and that aˆ does not exist and a is not open. If the firm does not adopt
bˆ, then vc = b kc and vo = 0. If the firm adopts bˆ, vc = bˆ(1 + σ/2)kc and vo = 0. Therefore, the
firm will adopt bˆ.
Finally, suppose that bˆ > b, and that aˆ exists or a is open. aˆ may be larger than a or not. If the
firm does not adopt bˆ, then vc = b kc and vo = bˆ(1 + σ/2)ko. If the firm adopts bˆ, vc = bˆ(1 + σ)kc
and vo = bˆ(1 + σ)ko. Therefore, the firm will always adopt bˆ if bˆ > b.
Lemma 7 extends the results of Lemma 3. The intuition is the same as before. The firm compares
a b z to aˆo b z, a bˆo z, or aˆo bˆo z. Incorporating the available open modules has an obvious positive
effect: because aˆ > a and bˆ > b the resulting product will be of higher quality than a b z. Moreover,
because aˆ and bˆ are open modules, there is also a benefit from user innovation. The drawback of
adopting aˆ and/or bˆ is that the quality of the outside OS project also increases (because more users
end up adopting the module/s and there is more user innovation). As a result, competitive pressure
intensifies. But because the software modules and service z are complementary, the increase in
quality in the commercial product is always larger than that of the outside OS product and, thus,
the positive effect always dominates the negative effect.
The following lemma says that when the outside OS project has one high-quality module only,
the firm will choose to compete through an open business model if user innovation σ is strong or
the value of service z is high.
Lemma 8. When the OS project has only one module with higher quality than the corresponding
firm’s module, there is a function σ(z) > 0, with σ′(z) < 0 such that firms choose Maˆ or Mbˆ for
σ < σ(z) and Oaˆbˆ for σ > σ(z).
Proof. We are examining cases in which one of the OS modules is better than that of the firm, and
the other module is worse. We know that the firm will always adopt the better OS module. What
we have to determine is in which situation it will choose to open its own module. There are two
effects of opening a module. On the one hand, user innovation increases the quality of C and OS
products. This effect is always positive (vc always increases more than vo), and will be larger when
σ or z are larger. On the other hand, the quality of the OS product increases because now it has
access to a better module. This effect is always negative. Therefore, for OS to be preferred to MS,
σ and z have to be large enough. Finally, a lower z implies that the corresponding σ necessary for
OS to be optimal has to be larger.
The intuition is the same as that given in the earlier lemmas for why the open business model
dominates when σ and/or z are high.
In conclusion, we can see that the analysis of these cases confirms our previous findings.
